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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
In the new era of modernity, the competitive environment has spread widely into 
all sectors including the electricity market which began since 1980s. A number of 
market models have been introduced and each model was designed appropriately with 
its local condition. The selection of the model used depends on the justification 
determined by power utilities or regulatory policies taking into account the technical 
and economic aspect point of view. Looking forward to an opened and competitive 
electricity trading market, Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) has aimed to 
restructure its current model to become a wholesale market model by taking the first 
step in 1992 through the introduction of the Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Since 
then MESI applies the Single Buyer Model which produces no transparent competition 
either on generation or demand side. Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) is the only 
company that acts as the power off taker by all power producers and sells the energy to 
all relevant parties. The purpose of this research is to study in depth the restructuring of 
electricity supply industry and identifying the advantages and disadvantages for each 
electricity market models, i.e. existing single buyer, pool and bilateral market model. 
The economic benefits from the view point of power producers under these models 
were also analyzed. The findings can be used by the Energy Commission (EC) as a 
starting point in planning towards the next step of competitive environment. Besides, 
the current power authority (TNB) and other private investors may also use these 
findings for their own forecast on the system planning. A case study was carried out in 
order to compare the three market models in term of generation revenue by using the 
Matlab Simulation under the real load profiles for peninsular of Malaysia. The results 
showed that the single buyer is uncompetitive but is controllable as TNB monopolise 
the market. However, both pool and bilateral market models are able to provide a 
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competitive environment but creates higher risk as the energy price might fluctuate 
from time to time in practical.  This shows that MESI should consider several policies if 
they plan to apply the alternative market models.  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Dalam menuju ke era permodenan, persekitaran persaingan telah diaplikasi 
secara meluas di dalam pelbagai sektor termasuklah dalam model pasaran elektrik yang 
bermula sejak 1980an. Beberapa jenis pasaran model telah diperkenalkan dan direka 
berdasarkan penyesuaian keadaan tempatan. Pemilihan pasaran yang diaplikasi 
bergantung kepada justifikasi penguasaha tenaga dengan mengambil kira pengaruh dari 
sudut teknikal atau ekonomi. Industri Bekalan Elektrik Malaysia (MESI) telah 
merancang untuk mengaplikasi pasaran elektrik yang lebih terbuka, maka langkah 
pertama yang telah diambil iaitu melalui pengenalan kepada Penjana Kuasa Bebas 
(IPP). Sejak itu MESI mengaplikasikan model pembeli tunggal yang hakikatnya telah 
gagal untuk menyediakan persekitaran persaingan baik dari sudut pembekal atau 
keperluan semasa. Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) merupakan satu-satunya syarikat di 
Malaysia yang membeli dan menjual tenaga kuasa elektrik kepada semua pihak. Tujuan 
kajian projek ini dijalankan adalah untuk mempelajari dan mengkaji dengan lebih 
mendalam tentang penstrukturan semula pasaran model and mengenalpasti kelebihan 
dan kekurangan bagi setiap jenis model seperti pembeli tunggal, pasaran berpusat dan 
pasaran bilateral. Kajian dari sudut kebaikan ekonomi bagi setiap model juga akan 
dianalisis. Hasil kajian ini boleh digunapakai oleh Suruhanjaya Tenaga (EC) sebagai 
satu titik permulaan dalam perancangan menuju ke pasaran persekitaran persaingan. 
Selain itu, pengusaha tenaga semasa (TNB) dan pelabur swasta boleh juga 
mengunapakai hasil kajian ini dalam perancangan mereka mengenai jangkaan 
sistem.Satu kajian telah dibuat untuk membandingkan ketiga-tiga model pasaran dari 
perspektif keuntungan kepada syarikat penjana elektrik dengan mengunakan simulasi 
MATLAB di bawah penggunaan profil beban bagi semenanjung Malaysia. Hasil 
menunjukkan model pembeli tunggal tidak dapat menyediakan pasaran persaingan 
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tetapi mampu dikawal kerana TNB menguasai keseluruhan pasaran. Manakala, kedua-
dua pasaran pusat dan bilateral mampu menyediakan pasaran persaingan tetapi 
mengundang risiko yang tinggi kerana harga tenaga boleh berubah dari masa ke masa. 
Ini menunjukkan MESI sepatutnya mengambil kira beberapa polisi sekiranya mereka 
benar-benar merancang mengaplikasi model pasaran alternatif ini.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Overview of Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) 
 
 
For almost a century, each sector in the electricity supply industry (ESI) which 
is generation, transmission and distribution were thought to be a natural monopoly. It is 
also has been vertically integrated within a utility and can be either, investor-owned and 
state-regulated or owned by the local municipality. But for Samuel Insull, the president 
of National Electric Light Association in 1890s, he had claimed that the business should 
be regulated at the state level [1]. During that period, consumers had no choice of 
buying the electrical energy except from the utility that held the monopoly for the 
supply of electricity in the area where these consumers were located. If the utilities were 
vertically integrated, this means that the utility generated the electrical energy, 
transmitted it from the power plants to the load centers and distributed it to individual 
consumers. In other cases, the utility from which consumers purchased electricity was 
responsible only for its sale and distribution local area. This distribution utility in turn 
had to purchase electrical energy from a generation and transmission utility that had a 
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monopoly over a wider geographical area. Irrespective of ownership and the level of 
vertical integration, geographical monopolies were the norm. 
 
 
In early 1980s, some economics started arguing that the monopoly status of 
electric utilities had removed the incentive to operate efficiently and encouraged 
unnecessary investments. They also argued that the cost of the mistakes that private 
utilities made should not be passed on to the consumers. Public utilities, on the other 
hand, were often too closely linked to the government. Politics could then interfere with 
good economics. For example, public utilities were treated as cash cows, and others 
were prevented from setting rates at level that reflects costs or were deprived of the 
capital that they needed for essential investments. However the status had remained the 
same until the expansion of transmission technology, which mainly for purposes of 
reliability had brought new possibilities for trade and competition.  
 
 
Later on, the electricity supply industry (ESI) had undergone a major transition 
worldwide, as new technology and attitudes towards utilities is being developed and 
changed. Basically, the objectives of these restructuring are to enhance efficiency, to 
promote competition in order to lower costs, to increase customer choice, to assemble 
private investment, and to merge public finances. The tools of achieving these 
objectives are the introduction of competition which is supported by regulation and the 
encouragement of private participation. Changes in the ESI structure had introduced a 
number of electricity market models which is designed appropriately with its local 
condition. These market models are the single buyer model, the pool market model, the 
bilateral contract model and hybrid/multilateral model.  
 
 
Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) on the other hand, had done the 
first step towards restructuring by encouraging private investors in producing electrical 
energy since 1992 following a nationwide power blackout and serious interruptions and 
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rationing. Besides that, the introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPP) had 
aided TNB to overcome the electricity shortage issue and enlarge the electrical energy 
reserve margin. The competition is valid only in generation sector while the 
transmission and distribution sector are still with TNB. This electricity market model is 
also known as the single buyer model and since then, MESI had applied this market 
model. Currently, there are 14 IPPs in the Peninsular of Malaysia and the electrical 
energy is sold to the TNB on a fixed rate based on the power purchase agreement 
(PPA). This agreement which last for 21 years is signed between the TNB and IPP for 
the purpose of market risks protection. The restructuring is supported with the existence 
of Energy Commission (EC) which is an electrical regulator in Malaysia. EC is obliged 
to not only design the appropriate electricity market model but also to setup suitable 
policies and regulation related to electricity industry.  
 
 
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
 
The objectives of this study are:- 
 
a) To study the electricity market models in restructured electricity supply industry 
b) To identify pros/advantages and cons/disadvantages for each electricity market 
model 
c) To analyze the economic benefits of these market models from the viewpoint of 
the power producers and consumers 
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1.3 Scope of Study 
 
 
Changes in the electricity supply structure have led to various types of electricity 
market models such as Single Buyer Model, Pool Market model, Bilateral Contract 
Model and Hybrid/Multilateral Model. This study gives details on each market model 
but depth explanation was only given to Single Buyer Model and the Pool Market 
model. This is due to the facts that the existing Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry 
(MESI) is applying the Single Buyer Model. The nearest market model that could be 
applied without major changes to the electricity supply structure is the Pool Market 
Model. Examples of the application for these two market models will be analyzed and 
the results found thus will aid the design of Pool Market model. Nevertheless, some 
examples on the application of Bilateral Market Model also will be added in order to get 
some overview on the model’s concept. The electricity trading that is being considered 
is only up to the transmission level. Consequently, the business is only between the 
generator as the seller and distributor as the buyer or customers without taking into 
account the end user.  
 
 
 
 
1.4 Problem Statement 
 
 
 In 1992, following a nationwide power blackout and a series of interruptions and 
rationing caused the government to conduct an immediate assessment of the nation’s 
power generation industry. As a result of rapid development of the national economy in 
the preceding years, it appeared the country was unable to cater for the parallel growth 
in demand for power. To narrow this widening gap, and under its successful 
privatization agenda, the Government identified the Independent Power Producer (IPP) 
model, whereby the capital-intensive development of new generation assets could be 
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outsourced to the private sector. This became the initiative that would deliver the 
immediate national power security needed to maintain Growth Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth whilst not putting unnecessary pressure on Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) 
resources. 
 
 
 The initial IPPs were awarded licenses to pursue the IPP model under power 
purchased agreements (PPAs) that would span periods of up to 21 years and govern 
how the IPP would construct, purchase and/or use of fuel, operate and sell energy 
produced. In this agreement, the power off taker which is TNB had agreed to pay to 
types of payment; energy and capacity payment. The energy payment is done based on 
the electricity consumed by TNB. Meanwhile, the capacity payment which is paid 
monthly regardless the usage performs two main roles. This type of payment provide 
extra revenue to the generator, to cover the capital and other fixed costs which are not 
covered by the energy price. It also provides incentives for generators to be available at 
times when the system needs generation capacity. As the power off taker TNB has to 
bear the high expenses and this has made TNB suffered massive profit erosion.  
 
 
TNB is also hit by the increasing of fuel cost. The government is bearing the 
burden of rising cost due to the subsidies. But the IPPs are not sharing any of these 
burdens. When the demand getting slower, TNB could not sustain the capacity payment 
as it is fixed. As it stands, electricity tariff have gone up for the end users. 
Consequently, consumers also faced risks as they depend on current market situation. 
Therefore, a drastic action should be taken by designing some policies or any 
suggestion to come out before the market collapsed. A new market design is required so 
that the consumers pay reasonable price, TNB makes reasonable profit and IPPs as well. 
Perhaps this study can be some forms of help in assisting in new policy set out and 
further research works to overcome the crisis.  
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1.5 Methodology  
 
 
In analyzing the economic benefits of the electricity market models applied for 
Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry (MESI), the following steps are undertaken:- 
 
a) Conduct literature review on existing electricity market models  
b) Analyze on the structure and operation for each market models 
c) Identify the pros and cons of the market models 
d) Formulate the mathematical equation representing the generation income and 
demand charge for each market models 
e) Conduct comparative analysis among the market models using Matlab 
Simulation approach 
f) Based on simulation results in (e), determine economic benefits among the 
trading parties 
 
 
Figure 1.1 below shows the study’s flowchart that explains the whole process for the 
study to accomplish its mission. 
 
  
1.6 Rep
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Chapter 3 represents the depth explanation of current situation for Malaysia 
Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) which applied the single buyer model at this 
moment of time. It consists of the market players, types of payment, and related current 
issues. Other than that, this chapter also discussed the frame work that has been planned 
for Malaysia towards restructuring and the progress status.  
  
 
A pool based market design for MESI is presented in Chapter 4. Two types of 
market settlement in pool market model which is one sided pool and two sided pool are 
being discussed in this chapter. Besides that, a hybrid model that able to overcome 
several issues arise throughout the process of applying the pool trading model are also 
included.  
 
 
Meanwhile, Chapter 5 will briefly explain on another market design for MESI 
which is based on bilateral. The descriptions is not detail as in pool market model as the 
purpose of this chapter is just to give brief overview on the model if the model is 
expected to be applied in MESI. This is because the application bilateral market model 
requires major changes in the MESI structure compare to pool market model. Hence, it 
is impossible for a developing country like Malaysia to directly change its structure to 
wholesale concept as it requires high cost. 
 
 
Chapter 6 explains about the case study conducted in order to compare all 
electricity market models which is single buyer, pool market model and bilateral market 
model in term of its generation revenue throughout the year. In this chapter, 
consequences of the application of new trading towards the market players can be 
examined. This is done by using the Matlab Simulation. Results of the simulation and 
analysis are discussed in Chapter 7. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study and suggests 
several future works that should be done. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING  
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Since 1980s, the electricity supply industry (ESI) is undergoing a major 
transition worldwide, as new technology and attitudes towards utilities is being 
developed and changed. Other factors that contribute to the restructuring of ESI are 
changes in political and ideological attitudes, high tariffs, managerial inadequacy, 
global financial drives, the rise of environmentalism, and the shortage of public 
resources for investment in developing countries [2].  
 
 
The revolution process of ESI comprises competition, restructuring, 
privatization and regulation. Basically, the objectives of these reforms are to enhance 
efficiency, to promote competition in order to lower costs, to increase customer choice, 
to assemble private investment, and to merge public finances. The tools of achieving 
these objectives are through the introduction of competition which is supported by 
regulation and the encouragement of private participation. An international approach for 
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the design of the legal, regulatory, and institutional sector framework has come into 
view and it included the following:- 
 
a) The privatization and restructuring of state-owned energy utilities 
b) The separation of regulatory and operational functions, the creation of a proper 
regulatory framework, and the establishment of an independent regulator to 
protect consumer interests and promote competition 
c) The vertical unbundling of the electricity industry into generation, transmission, 
distribution and trade (services) 
d) The introduction of competition in generation and trade the regulation of 
monopolistic activities in transmission and distribution 
e) The promotion of private participation in investment and management through 
privatization, concessions, and new entry 
f) The reduction of subsidies and rebalancing of tariffs in order to bring prices in 
line with costs and to reduce market distortions 
 
 
Electricity trading refers to any number of financial and/or physical transactions 
associated with the ultimate delivery of a host of desirable energy-related services and 
products to wholesale and, increasingly, retail customers. Power marketers, those 
engaged in such trade, however, need not own any generation, transmission or 
distribution facilities or assets. They rely on others for the physical delivery of the 
underlying services. Moreover, power marketers operate primarily as contractual 
intermediaries, usually between one or more generators and one or more customers. 
 
 
Electricity market trading is quite different from other commodities because of 
the nature of electricity which cannot be stored, its availability must be instantaneous 
and absolute, as well as the technical complexities of the expertise, knowledge and 
planning capabilities that only power engineers can provide. For electricity market to 
perform successfully, two types of expertise must converge [3]: 
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a) A high level of technological expertise in the domain of power engineering, and 
b) Financial and business expertise allowing market trading 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Electricity Trading Worldwide 
 
 
For regulators, the creation of trading exchanges can offer the chance to build a 
truly open and competitive market, guided by a global knowledge base of the successes 
and failures of other exchanges in other industries around the world. Energy exchanges 
enable the development of the wholesale business. In addition to the trading of physical 
quantities, ‘future’ markets are created making extensive use of financial products. 
Many exchanges offer multi-energy (i.e. electricity, gas, and oil) services, sometimes 
extending to other commodities as drivers as metal, pulp and paper. 
 
  
The number and nature of players will evolve as the electricity market continues 
to open and the liquidity of exchanges increases. It is might be that electricity trading 
will occur increasingly over the internet in the coming years. There is a lot to be gained 
for all parties through these new markets. But it can be a complex process, and 
companies should evaluate participation in a trading exchange against the current 
market trends, the drivers in energy markets and the broader developments in financial 
and commodity trading. 
 
 
Such considerations are unlikely to lessen the speed at which trading exchanges 
in the energy sector are growing. Instead, market forces, technology, and legislation will 
shape the new exchange landscape, creating an environment in which competition 
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increases rapidly and consolidation occurs. It is vital that this shaping influence is 
allowed to continue, as for a market to successfully move to a deregulated mode, the 
basics such as maintaining an adequate balance of regional supply and demand must be 
established. 
 
 
 Across the world, competition in energy markets has driven the development of 
wholesale energy trading. There is an enormous variety in the speed and willingness of 
markets to deregulate, from country to country, and even from state to state. Many 
countries already have fully competitive and mature markets while other countries still 
do not plan to deregulate their gas and electricity industries. 
 
   
 
 
2.3 Restructuring of ESI in Other Countries 
 
  
 The restructuring of ESI had occurred around the world ranging from the most 
advanced countries to the developing countries. Below are some of the restructuring 
that had occurred. 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Electricity Trading in United Kingdom (UK) 
 
  
 In England and Wales before privatization had began, the electricity industry 
was a classic, vertically integrated, government-owned monopoly, seen at that time as 
the best way to provide a secure electricity supply. Consumers had no choice of supplier 
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and had to buy electricity from their local regional electricity company (REC), so that 
price competition was not possible.  
 
 
 The UK is one of the pioneer countries in developing a free market electricity 
trading system. Initially market reform involved creating an Electricity Pool for 
England and Wales with a single wholesale electricity price. Producers sold to the Pool 
and licensed suppliers purchased electricity from the Pool. Pool participants were able 
to negotiate bilateral contracts. However, the Pool performances did not allow the 
development of full competition. On 27th March 2001, New Electricity Trading 
Arrangement (NETA) for England and Wales were launched. NETA provided new 
structure and rates for England and Wales electricity market. Under NETA there were 
major developments in which electricity is bought and sold, with major competition in 
generation and supply, with a wide range of new players competing in the liberalized 
energy market. The stated objectives of NETA are to benefit electricity consumers 
through lower electricity prices resulting from the efficiency of market economics. 
Promotion of competition in power generation and electricity supply, in order to use 
market forces to drive consumer costs down, was, and remains, a key objective of 
actions to liberalize and ‘deregulate’ electricity markets in the UK. The transactions 
taking place within the NETA markets are electricity price-quantity transactions on a 
half-hourly basis. 
 
 
 NETA is a wholesale market, comprising trading between generators and 
suppliers of electricity in England and Wales. Under NETA, bulk electricity is traded 
forward through bilateral contracts and on one or more power exchanges. NETA also 
provides central balancing mechanism, which do two things: they help the National 
Grid Company (NGC) to ensure that demand meets supply, second by second; and they 
sort out who owes what to whom for any surplus or shortfalls. The majority of trading 
(98 per cent in the first year) takes place in the forward contracts markets. A very small 
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percentage of electricity traded (2 per cent in the first year) is subject to the balancing 
arrangements. 
 
 
 Under NETA the market provided through power exchanges replaces the 
previous Pool arrangement, allowing market players to trade electricity up to one day 
ahead of the requirement for physical delivery. The National Grid Company (NGC) 
operates as system operator for England and Wales, managing the HV transmission 
system and also providing all the technical and operational services normally demanded 
by the system to ensure its integrity including load forecasting, ensuring system security 
and stability, frequency control, and reactive power control. NGC acts on both a 
physical and a financial level through the balancing mechanism, selecting bids and 
offers for incremental or decremental supply of electricity in order to achieve physical 
balance between generation and demand. 
 
 
However, in April 2005, the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Access (BETTA) arrangements were applied with new set of wholesale electricity 
trading and transmission arrangements. BETTA which supersedes the NETA has enable 
competition market in the Great Britain as it becomes an extension of the England and 
Wales market. BETTA intends to address this restriction on market development by 
introducing three new features [4]: 
 
a) A common set of trading rules so that electricity can be traded freely across the 
UK 
b) A common set of rules for access to and charging for the transmission network 
c) A GB system operator, independent of generation and supply interests so that 
those who seek to use the system and access the market can be confident that the 
system operator has no incentives towards bias 
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Under BETTA, generators will have much more freedom on the one hand, but 
be much more accountable on the other. Any generator without a customer portfolio of 
its own will still have to sell its electricity into the network, but it will now be able to 
sell that power to any companies it chooses throughout England, Wales or Scotland. 
And it can sell that power at a price determined solely between buyer and seller, on a 
contract which can start and finish at times of its own choosing. 
 
 
But BETTA also means that a generator will be bound to adhere to the terms of 
his contract in a much more closely-regulated manner. Any under-delivery or over 
delivery of power against a contract puts the generator in a position of ‘imbalance’. This 
‘imbalance’ can mean that the generator has to buy power from the market or sell power 
to the market to maintain a balanced position. These buy or sell prices are known as 
System Buy Price and System Sell Price and they can be quite punitive. 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Electricity Trading in California 
 
  
 The pioneer California market provided the most severe challenge to 
competitive electricity market philosophy. Restructuring of the ESI of California took 
place in 1996, with the aim of bringing the benefits of competition to consumers. Prior 
to this regional utilities companies-investor-owned utilities (IOUs) provided monopoly 
supply and services. These former utilities now each provide a regulated distribution 
service in their areas, allowing direct access to third-party energy service suppliers; 
consumers now have a choice of electricity supplier. 
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 When the new California electricity market structure took effect, the utilities had 
the prices for their consumers frozen at 10 per cent below the level at vesting in the 
expectation that costs and prices would fall. It was anticipated that consumer electricity 
prices set at this level would allow the utilities to recover the cost of investments that 
had been made before market liberalization stranded costs. An events unfolded, this 
proved to be entirely unfounded and resulted in the utilities business becoming non-
viable. 
 
 
The crisis in the California electricity markets resulted from a combination of 
factors [5]. 
 
a) Exceptionally high summer temperatures significantly increasing electricity 
peak demand 
b) A lack of generating capacity in California and the West of America in relation 
to the strong growth of electrical demand following economics growth in 
California 
c) A shortage of water resulting in relatively limited hydro-power import 
availability from the North West of America 
d) An increase in gas prices for power generation compared with previous years 
e) Exercise of market power by generators and other market players. 
f) Environmental restraints on the construction of new generating plant and 
operation of existing plant 
g) Weakness flaws in the design of the electricity market including limitations on 
forward contracting, fixed consumer prices, but variable wholesale electricity 
prices 
h) Insufficient importance being given to power engineering expertise in design of 
market structures 
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Shortage of installed capacity or plant availability due to outages, maintenance, 
or generator market power, seems to have been a key driver for the California 
difficulties. Structural weakness in the design of the California market include restraints 
on consumer prices but free competition in the wholesale electricity prices and 
constraints on utilities to buy through a power exchange. These factors were major 
contributors to the problems of California electricity market. In order to ensure proper 
and reliable market trading it is imperative to ensure a technically viable and reliable 
system. Electricity markets demand technological expertise in power engineering plus a 
financial and business expertise that allows market trading. 
 
 
The problems in California are not inherent problems with “deregulation,” but 
result  from the way that California implemented its reforms, combined with a good 
deal of bad luck and ineffective government responses to its effects. Similar reforms in 
other countries and other regions of the United States have been more successful in 
achieving their goals.  
 
 
2.3.3 Electricity Trading in India 
 
  
 Electricity reform process in India is already in action although at a slow pace 
[6]. Several state electricity board are being unbundled into three distinct corporations 
namely Generation, Transmission and distribution. The distribution system are being 
horizontally broken down into manageable Distribution Companies (Distco) with 
separate accountability and privatized for better efficiency in metering, billing and 
revenue collection. The system operation functions at the regional/national level can be 
with central transmission utility, while state transmission utilities may manage load 
dispatch centers in line with transmission system operator (TSO) concepts and these 
should not be allowed to have financial interest in the trading of power. 
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One power pool in each state managed by State Transmission Utilities (STUs) 
and one in regional basis Central Transmission Utilities (CTU) may be established. 
Regional Electricity Board (REBs) can assume the responsibility to operate the regional 
power exchanges. Since REBs are proposed for managing the power exchanges, certain 
important planning and operational functions should be transferred to the Regional 
Load Dispatch Centre (RLDCs). All the non-competitive old generators and old IPP 
having old contracts shall remain under regulatory control of the regulatory 
commissions and should supply power to the state power pools only at the regulated 
price. Information flow is one of the main concerns along with the Distribution 
Management System (DMS), which is presently at a very nascent stage. These must be 
properly addressed before adopting competition at retail level. 
 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Electricity Trading in Korea 
 
 
 With a vertically integrated power system, the Korean utility provided the 
electricity successfully during the past decades with high economic development and 
high demand growth. And the productivity of the industry and price level was believed 
to be beyond the international average. Nevertheless, Korean electricity industry had a 
strong push for structure changes or restructuring [7]. As a matter of fact there was an 
evaluation works on the management of Korean Electrical Power Company (KEPCO) 
from July, 1994 to June, 1996 conducted by Korea Industry and Economy Research 
Institute and two accounting firms, from which a phase-in approach for the restructuring 
and privatization of the electric power industry was recommended. From June in 1997, 
a committee, named "Electric Power Industry Restructuring Committee", consisted 12 
members of scholars, researchers, industry personnel and experts from related fields 
was formed to promote restructuring the electricity supply industry (ESI) in Korea. The 
major forces for the restructuring may be summarized as follows: 
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a) The economic crisis started at the end of 1997 leading the Government to 
initiate the fundamental reform of the industrial structure to improve the national 
productivity: The public industries such as electric utility were among the main 
targets of the reform.  
b) International trend towards competitive electricity market recognizing the 
benefits of competition in the electricity supply industry: The international 
evidence in support of restructuring was compelling.  
c) Potential inefficiencies in oversized KEPCO and public ownership: There has 
been general belief that public ownership and monopoly would eventually result 
in economic inefficiencies, which induced skepticism about the efficiency of 
KEPCO.  
d) Steep increase of electricity demand requires additional 45,000 MW to be built 
by 2015. 
e) Lack of capital due to retail price regulation: By 2015 investment and private or 
foreign funds of about 56 billion dollars or 7.5 billion dollars annually are 
required to build new power. 
 
 
 
 
2.4 The structure of electricity supply industry (ESI) 
 
 
 There several models of structure that have been designed based on the region 
itself, but the four basic structure models of the electricity industry that have been 
widely adopted are [8]: 
 
a) Model 1: Vertically Integrated Utility/Monopoly 
b) Model 2: Single Buyer Model/Purchasing Agency 
c) Model 3: Wholesale Competition 
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d) Model 4: Retail Competition 
 
 
These model is seems to be the steps or process in order to achieve the ESI 
objectives and build a better structure. There are also country that tried to change the 
structure instantaneously but it require detailed design as complexity of the market 
model is proportional to the types of competition that being held.  
 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Model 1: Vertically Integrated Utility 
 
 
 Model 1 indicates the most common electricity industry structure prior to 
deregulation. In this model, the utility controls and owns all or most of generation, 
transmission and distribution facilities within its region. It also performs a monopoly on 
selling electric power to consumers; hence there is no competition occurs and customers 
have no choice but to purchase electricity from their own local utility. The utility has 
full control and is responsible over all sectors of generation, transmission and 
distribution within its control area. The utility can be either publicly owned and not 
operated for profit, or has rates (prices) that are set by regulatory organizations.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 (a) below indicates completely vertical integrated utilities which fully 
own generators (GenCo), transmission (TransCo and GridCo) and distribution (DistCo) 
sectors while for Figure 2.1 (b), the generations and transmission are handled by one 
utility which sell the energy to local monopoly distribution companies that could be one 
or more separate companies. 
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Figure 2.1 Vertically Integrated Utility (VIU) 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Model 2: Single Buyer Model / Purchasing Agency 
 
 
The single buyer model is being the first step toward the introduction of 
competition in the electricity supply industry. This model was first seen in developing 
countries in the 1990s. During that time, governments in several countries authorized 
private investors to construct power plants and be the independent power producers 
(IPPs). These IPPs is to generate electricity and sell it to the national power company so 
that there will be no shortage of electricity. This model allows the single buyer which is 
the purchasing agency, to choose a number of different generators to encourage 
competition in generation.  
 
 
Generation
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Consumers
Generation
Transmission
Distribution/Supply 
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  Energy sales 
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Some governments went further and split the national utility into generation, 
transmission and distribution companies, intending ultimately to turn over generation 
and distribution facilities to the private sector. Most decided to keep strategically 
important transmission and dispatch facilities in state hands, however, and awarded 
exclusive rights to the newly formed transmission and dispatch company and thus 
become the single buyer where it will purchase electricity from generators and sell it to 
distributors.  
 
 
  
Figure 2.2  The single buyer model for electricity trading 
 
Figure 2.2 (a) shows the integrated version of single buyer which competition 
only occurs at generation sector. Figure 2.2 (b) represent the disaggregated version and 
indicates further evolution of the model where the utility no longer owns any generation 
capacity and purchases all its energy from the IPPs. The distribution and retail activities 
are also disaggregated as DistCo purchase the energy consumed by their consumers 
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from the wholesale purchasing agency. The rates set by the purchasing agency must be 
regulated because it has monopoly power over DistCo. This does not cover a cost 
reflective price but has the opportunity to introduce competition without extra expenses.  
 
 
 
 
2.4.3 Model 3: Wholesale Competition 
 
 
In this model, no central organization is responsible for the provision of 
electrical energy and the transmission network is open to all parties. DistCo purchase 
the electricity consumed by customer directly from generating companies. This allows 
generators to compete and sell their electricity directly to any distribution companies 
and brokers or offer it in a power exchange. In turn, the company collects payments 
from the generators and distribution companies for using their transmission facilities 
and services. These transactions take place in a wholesale market through two types of 
transaction; either pool trading or bilateral contract trading. The only functions that 
remain centralized are the operation of the spot market and the transmission network. 
Figure 2.3 depicted the wholesale competition model. 
 
 
  Distribution companies in this phase have the dual role of operating the 
distribution network and selling electricity. The latter role requires distribution 
companies to shop around and get the best deals from generators. This has prompted the 
growth of brokers and power exchanges, which can facilitate further competition. If 
necessary, distribution companies can also agree on long term contracts, which can 
stabilized the price of their electricity purchases. Wholesale competition can further 
liberalize the market and bring down wholesale electricity prices. 
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Figure 2.3 Wholesale Competition model 
  
 
 
 
2.4.4 Model 4: Retail Competition 
 
 
 Figure 2.4 describes final form of competitive electricity market in whereby all 
consumers can choose their supplier. Because of the transaction costs, only the largest 
consumers choose to purchase energy directly on the wholesale market. Small and 
medium consumers purchase it from retailers, who in turn buy it in the wholesale 
market. 
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Figure 2.4 Retail Competition model of electricity market based 
 
 
  In this model, the activities at the distribution companies are separated from the 
retail activities because they no longer have a local monopoly for the supply of 
electrical energy in the area covered by their network. The only remaining monopoly 
functions are thus the provision and operation of the transmission and distribution 
network. The retail price no longer has to be regulated because small consumers can 
change retailer when they are offered a better price. From an economics perspective, 
this model is the most satisfactory because energy prices are set through market 
interactions. However, it requires considerable amounts of metering, communication 
and data processing. The cost of the transmission and distribution network is still 
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charged to all their users as it is done on a regulated basis because these networks 
remain monopolies. 
 
 
 Table 2.1 below shows the summarization of important characteristic for each 
model. These models have quite different types of trading arrangements which require 
different sorts of contracting arrangements and have different regulatory requirements. 
These models also may require different ownership for the companied operating in the 
sector and have different implication for stranded assets. These dimensions do not 
define the models. The defining characteristic which distinguishes the models from each 
other is competition and choice.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Structural Alternatives 
Characteristic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Definition 
Monopoly 
at all levels 
Competition 
in generation 
Competition in 
generation and 
choice for Distcos 
Competition in 
generation and 
choice for final 
consumers 
Competition 
Generators 
NO YES YES YES 
Choice for 
retailers 
NO NO YES YES 
Choice for final 
consumers 
NO NO NO YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
27
2.5 Electricity Trading Arrangements 
  
 
The trading arrangements in a model are the set of rules buyers and sellers 
(collectively, traders) have to follow when they make transactions [9]. The variable 
demand for electricity and the need for instantaneous response will mean that there will 
always be differences between trader contract for and actual generation and 
consumption. The market mechanism must account for these imbalance and see that 
they are pay for.  
 
 
Since all the power flows over a system according to the laws of physics, there 
is no way to tell whose power actually went to whom. There has to be a method of 
measuring and accounting for flows into and out of the network, or over 
interconnectors, if the transactions are to be invoiced and paid. There are many ways to 
do this, which vary in complexity with the number of traders who can use the network 
to make independent transactions.  
 
 
Prices for using delivery networks must give efficient location decisions and 
allow for the economic dispatch of plant. In Models 1 and 2, these decisions can be 
taken jointly with the decision to build plant, and there is no need for separate prices; 
but in Models 3 and 4, prices have to do the work of optimizing location and dispatch. 
 
 
 There are several types of electricity trading arrangement that were applied in 
deregulated structure such as: 
 
a) Single Buyer Model 
b) Pool Market Model 
c) Bilateral Contract Model 
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d) Multilateral trading which combines the pool and bilateral model 
 
 
Malaysia is one of the developing countries that currently apply the single buyer 
model for their electricity trading arrangements. The aim of this study is to identify both 
pro and cons for each electricity market models besides analyzing the economic benefits 
among the players. Detail explanations regarding electricity trading arrangement will be 
covered in the first three models listed above. The single buyer model, pool market 
model and bilateral market model will be explained further later in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 respectively. No detail explanation on the multilateral trading model as it 
only combines of both pool and bilateral model features. Under this model, it is flexible 
that both sellers and buyers are option to choose trading through the pool or bilateral 
contract. The pool would serve all participants (buyers and sellers) who choose not to 
sign bilateral contracts. On the other hand, the participant who may acquires the 
economic equivalent of bilateral contracts if they do not take part in the pool system. 
This market model requires a power exchange (PX) involvement to act as an exchanger 
to balance supply and demand as well as running pool system.  
  
 
 
 
2.6 The Economic Viewpoint of the Parties Involved 
 
 
 There are much different roles that GenCo, TransCo and DisCo play in single 
buyer, pool trading and bilateral contract models. The Table 2.2 set out the economic 
point of view of different parties in each market models in brief. The details economic 
viewpoint on these electricity market models in term of generation revenue will be 
explained in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
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Table 2.2:  The Economic Viewpoint of Parties Involved 
Model Single Buyer Model Pool  Trading Model Bilateral Contract Model 
GenCo 1. Power sold to GenCo is guaranteed 
through PPA 
2. Long term PPA is attractive since the 
payment collection from purchasing 
agency is profitable. i.e. capacity 
payment and energy payment apply 
3. Competition between GenCos is not 
intensive as in other models. 
1. Power sold to PoolCo is based on 
merit order, the least generator 
will sell first in line 
2. Only based on the energy price 
that have to reflects all the 
production costs 
3. Create competition among 
generators as they will submit the 
lowest bid  
1. Direct sells power to DisCo 
through the contract agreed by 
both parties 
2. Only energy payment is apply, 
hence more competition between 
GenCo. 
3. Bidding price based on the 
available capacity 
TransCo 1. No access fee and the cost is covered 
by the purchasing agent 
1. Only provide power transmission and facilities maintenance services, and 
collect access fee from both GenCos and/or DisCos. 
DisCo 1. Buy power from only one source, i.e. 
TransCo 
2. The energy price is stable and 
therefore easier for end customers 
make investment decision. But the 
price is fixed 
1. Buy power from Independent 
Market Operator  
2. The energy price is 
uncontrollable. It based on the bid 
and offer by the market players 
1. Freely negotiate with different 
GenCos to achieve the needs (e.g. 
price and delivery) 
2. Have to consult with TransCo for 
delivery and the transaction is 
based on the lines security 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
CURRENT ELECTRICITY MARKET IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
The history of electricity supply industry in Malaysia has started since as early 
as the year 1894 when the first electricity was generated by a private entity for its own 
consumption. In 1949, a national company named Central Electricity Board (CEB) was 
established which later changed its name to National Electricity Board (NEB). In a 
move to improve efficiency as well as to reduce the government’s financial burden, the 
NEB had been corporatised and later privatized in 1990 under the name of Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad (TNB). Its core functions include generating, transmitting and 
distributing electricity to consumers. In its effort to break the monopoly and encourage 
competition, the government of Malaysia had allowed Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs) to participate in the generation sector and since then Malaysia Electricity Supply 
Industry (MESI) had applied the single buyer model with the TNB as the purchasing 
agency.  
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3.2 MESI towards Restructuring 
 
 
Malaysia is currently undergoing reforming its electric supply industry into a 
more transparent, effective and competitive power market. In March 1998, the 
Government made the decision to establish an Independent Grid System Operator 
(IGSO) as part of the 7th Malaysian Plan and in the same year a decision was also made 
to revise the regulatory framework for the energy sector. These government driven 
initiatives can be summarized below: 
 
a) Repeal the Electricity Act 1990 and enact the Electricity Act 2001 
b) Enact the Energy Commission Act and the formation of the Energy 
Commission; and 
c) Establish and operationalise the Independent Grid System Operator 
(IGSO) with core functions of long term generation and transmission 
planning market dispatch planning and settlement. 
 
 
The restructuring of the MESI has been driven by a number of objectives. These 
objectives have been spelt out by the government and have been used as the guiding 
principle to evaluate and recommend a course of action.  
 
a) To achieve transparency in the ESI 
b) To promote efficiency in the utilization of financial and technical 
resources in the development and operations of the industry 
c) To provide a level playing field for all players in the ESI 
d) To achieve competitive electricity prices for all consumers 
 
 
The proposed MESI structure would include generation, transmission, 
distribution, retail, an independent market operator (IMO) and a grid system operator 
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(IGSO) [10]. The IMO would be the new market administrator and long term planner 
who will be responsible for introduction competition into generation market initially 
and possibly the retail market. Nevertheless, the target of operating the IMO by 1st 
January 2001 was not achieved. 
 
 
The first stage of the restructuring known as Stage I (Single Buyer Model) was 
succeeded to be operated in year 2001. This model is intended to create competition at 
the generation level via the establishment of a power pool with a Single Buyer of power 
from the market. TNB is expected to be the single buyer at this stage. Meanwhile, a 
Multi Buyer Model which is the Stage II, was proposed to be operated in year 2005 but 
was put on hold as other target was put on hold as well. This model supposedly will 
further enhance the wholesale market by introducing more than one buyer from the 
power market to provide for specific segments of customers. Table 3.1 shows the plan 
headed for the restructuring, the targeted year and the current status.  
 
 
Table 3.1: MESI Planning Towards Restructuring 
Year Planning Status 
1992 The introduction of independent power producer Done 
1998 Establish an independent grid system operator (IGSO) On Hold 
2001 Operational date of the independent market operator (IMO) On Hold 
2001 Stage 1: Single Buyer Model 
-competition among generators 
Done 
2005 Stage 2: Multi Buyer Model / Wholesale market 
-competition among generators and distributors 
On Hold 
 
 
The monopoly status of Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) in electricity industry 
comes to an end when the Malaysian Government decided to introduce Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) in the generation sector with the aim of not only to avoid 
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electricity shortage but also to facilitate competitions among generators. Yet, the TNB 
still conquers the electricity market in term of its transmission and distribution. YTL 
Corporation Sdn. Bhd. is the first IPP awarded the licence to construct gas-fired power 
and from time to time, new IPPs have been given the permission to supply the 
electricity. At this point of time, there are fourteen private producers that serve 
electricity throughout Peninsular Malaysia via TNB. The total installed capacity for 
these private power producers is reached up to 14775.40 MW.  
 
 
Eventually, Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) which was 
traditionally vertically integrated had moved to a single buyer model in 2001. In this 
model, TNB was the power purchasing agency which has the authority to choose a 
number of generators base on their energy bid price in order to supply the electricity for 
peninsular of Malaysia. This had created a competitive environment in the generation 
sector. MESI aims to establish an Independent Grid System Operator (IGSO) and 
Independent Market Operator (IMO) in 1998 and 2001 respectively but fails to do so. 
The plan to move on with the application of Multi Buyer Model in 2005 is being put on 
hold as other plans are being halted as well. These may due to the effect of California’s 
Crisis and the long term agreement bonded between the private power producers and 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB).  
 
 
 
 
3.3 Implementation of Single Buyer Model in MESI 
 
 
The single buyer model first appeared in developing countries in the 1990s. In 
order to relieve capacity shortages while conserving scarce public resources, 
governments in several countries authorized private investors to construct power plants. 
The independent power producers (IPPs) have to generate electricity and sell it to the 
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national power company or the power purchasing agency. IPPs sold their output 
through long term power purchase agreements (PPA) that consists of fixed capacity 
charges to protect investors from market risks.  
 
 
The government of certain countries went further and split the national utility 
into generation, transmission, and distribution companies, intending ultimately to turn 
over generation and distribution facilities to the private sector. Most decided to keep 
strategically important transmission and dispatch facilities in state hands, however, and 
awarded exclusive rights to the newly formed transmission and dispatch company 
which will be the single buyer. The agency had to purchase electricity from generators 
and sell it to distributors. In theory, transmission and dispatch can be separated from the 
wholesale electricity trading monopoly. However, in practice, developing countries 
opting for the single buyer model kept these functions together to reduce transaction 
costs.  
 
 
The single buyer model is implemented in MESI since 2001. In this model, the 
TNB plays the role as the power purchase agency which is obliged to buy the electricity 
generated by Tenaga Nasional Berhad Generation (TNBG) itself and the Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs). Although IPPs were introduced to provide competition in 
generation, the terms under which these IPPs were introduced did not affect real 
competition in generation. The PPAs between the IPPs and TNB as power off-taker 
provided for guaranteed return for the IPPs with very little risk borne by them over 21 
years tenure. Most of PPAs are structured in such a way that they comprise of a two 
tariff which is capacity payment and energy payment portion. The detail terms included 
in this agreement will be explained further is next section. 
 
 
The current structure of Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) is 
depicted as in Figure 3.1[2]. It can be seen that all power producers can only sell their 
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output to the TNB Transmission and Distribution and cannot directly go to the 
consumer’s side. This means that the power producers do not have any other choice 
except depends on competition among each other. On the other hand, the TNB 
Transmission and Distribution has the authority to choose a number of generators that 
will supply the demand required by the consumers. The centralized electricity at power 
purchasing agency also can be purchased by local distributors before being distributed 
to the consumers.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: MESI structure; Single Buyer Model  
 
 
  
 
3.3.1 Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) 
 
 
A power purchase agreement (PPA) is a contract for the sale of energy, 
availability and other generation services from an independent power producer (IPP). It 
is normally developed between the owners of private power plants and the buyer of the 
electricity. Therefore, this agreement is widely being used in the single buyer model 
occupied competition in generation sector. The single buyer is the central purchasing 
agency, who may be the operator of a transmission grid performing the roles of dispatch 
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and network control, or alternatively an integrated generating company. However, PPAs 
may also be used in more competitive systems such as wholesale competition and retail 
competition, for sales of electricity from a single IPP to an electricity wholesaler or 
aggregator. The wholesaler could combine purchases under a number of PPAs with spot 
purchases and sales, to assemble the volume of electricity required to service wholesale 
or retail contracts. PPAs may therefore be found in any system where it is possible to 
establish an IPP. 
 
 
As Malaysia had introduced the private producers in generation sector, the PPA 
is being signed between the IPP and TNB as the purchasing agency. This agreement is 
valid for 21 years, whereby the usual range of this kind of agreement is between 15 to 
20 years.  A guaranteed return for IPPs with little risk is stated clearly in this agreement 
in order to encourage more private investors to participate. However, later on, the term 
in the PPA had created a problem to TNB. The basic information contains in this 
agreement are [11]: 
 
a) Definitions 
b) Purchase and sale of contracted capacity and energy (such as steam, hot 
water and/or chilled water in the case of cogeneration and trigeneration 
plants) 
c) Operation of the power plant 
d) Financing of the power plant 
e) Guarantee of performances 
f) Penalties 
g) Payments (capacity payments which covers the capital costs of the 
generators and energy payments to cater for the variation of demand 
during plant operation) 
h) Force majeure 
i) Default and early termination 
j) Miscellaneous 
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k) Term and conditions 
 
 
The main economic elements of PPAs are the clauses relating to energy prices 
and payment for availability. However, this study will discussed the depth explanations 
on energy price, payment for availability, payment for ancillary and other terms and 
conditions [8]. This is because this thesis is focuses on the economic aspects from the 
perspective of the generators. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Energy Price 
 
 
The energy price, in RM/MWh, is the price paid per unit of incremental output. 
The energy price is a key determinant of the pattern of dispatch. Ideally, generators 
should run in “merit-order”, i.e. only the generators with the lowest running cost (i.e. 
variable costs per unit) should be generating to meet demand. If an IPP has a contract in 
which the energy price lies above its variable cost of output, the incentive for efficient 
dispatch is lost. The owner of IPP will want to run at all times, regardless the cost of 
other generators on the system and even if the IPP displaces other, cheaper generators. 
On the other hand, the dispatcher will be reluctant to dispatch the IPP except at times 
when the marginal cost of other generators is very high; the dispatcher may hold the IPP 
off the system, even when it represents a cheaper source than some generators who are 
currently on line. 
 
 
For efficient dispatch, the dispatcher needs to know (and pay) the IPP’s actual 
variable cost of generation. The energy price is therefore should be as close as possible 
to the costs of fuel burnt in generating 1MWh, plus some allowance for operation and 
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maintenance costs which depend on the level of energy production. The dispatcher will 
then dispatch the IPP only when it is cheaper than other sources. The owner of the IPP 
will be indifferent to the pattern of dispatch, as it will have no bearing on total profits. 
However, since the IPP has no particular incentive to run, the IPP’s earnings must be 
made partially conditional on availability, which will be explained later. 
 
 
The energy price may take a simple form, i.e. just a single price per MWh. 
However, it is possible for the PPA to specify different prices for different stages of 
operation, e.g. a price per start-up, and a different price for different levels of output. 
Sometimes penalties are charged if generators fail to generate according to the 
instructions of the dispatcher, to encourage them to generate exactly as instructed. 
 
 
Energy prices may be fixed, or set by a formula which includes separate terms 
for the cost of fuel and the assumed rate of conversion into electricity (“thermal 
efficiency”). It is usually possible to estimate the likely level of efficiency in 
combustion. However, the cost of fuel can vary widely. Fixing the unit cost of fuel in 
the PPA would expose the owner to risk, in the event that actual fuel costs rose. 
Whenever actual costs rose above this figure in the PPA, the IPP would make a loss on 
every kWh generated and its owners would be unwilling to let it be run at all. 
 
 
One way to limit the risk is to include the actual purchase costs of the 
generator’s fuel and its actual thermal efficiency. However, energy prices in PPAs do 
not usually reflect the full actual costs of generation incurred by the generator, since this 
rule would remove any incentive for the IPP to seek out lower cost fuels, or to increase 
efficiency of operation. Instead, energy prices in PPAs usually tied to the external, of 
fuel prices, thermal efficiency and other variable costs, which are not influenced by the 
decisions of the IPPs themselves. The owners of the IPP then have a profit incentive to 
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operate more efficiently and to find cheaper fuel sources because, by doing so, they cut 
their costs but leave their revenues unchanged.  
 
 
Indexing energy prices in this way provides a strong incentive for efficiency, but 
still imposes some risk on IPPs, since the index may fail to reflect some special factor 
which increases the IPP’s fuel costs (such as an increase in local transportation costs). 
Some of fuel prices indices therefore include an allowance for the IPP’s actual fuel 
costs, where they can be observed. The more heavily the index reflects the IPP’s actual 
fuel costs, the lower the risk faced by the owners, but the weaker the incentive for the 
IPP’s owners to minimize costs. The owner of the generator and the buyer of the 
generator’s output therefore have to negotiate an index, which achieves an acceptable 
balance of risk and incentives. 
 
 
For the conclusion, the energy price should cover the variable cost of output 
when requested by the dispatcher. This provides the information that the dispatcher 
needs to ensure an efficient dispatch. The price should therefore reflect as closely as 
possible the actual variable cost of generation, but should be tied to external indices of 
fuel prices to give the generator an incentive to minimize fuel (and other) costs. 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Payments for availability 
 
 
Availability payments in PPAs perform two main roles which are to: 
 
a) Provide extra revenue to the generator, to cover the capital and other 
fixed costs which are not covered by the energy price per MWh 
b) Provide incentives for generators to be available at times when the 
system needs generation capacity. 
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The second of these roles is particularly important for mid-merit and peak 
generators, which need to be available at specific times of the year, when the value of 
generation is particularly high. However, even base load generators need to be given 
representative signals about the value of their output to the system, to ensure that they 
time their maintenance outages to coincide with periods when the system is in surplus 
and the value of output is low. 
 
 
The first step in negotiating availability payments is to agree a target level of 
availability in terms of a MW level and a number of hours per year. The target level of 
availability may be specified for the year in total. Next, the PPA must specify the fixed 
annual payment to be paid if the generator achieves the target of availability. The fixed 
annual payment would normally be expected to cover the non-variables of the 
generator, including a normal rate of profit. Finally, the contract must specify a system 
of availability bonuses and penalties for availability above or below the target level. 
These bonuses and penalties give the generator a continuous incentive to ensure that the 
generator capacity is maintained and available. 
 
 
Availability payments are needed to cover the non-variable costs which are 
incurred to keep the generator available, whether or not the generator is required to 
produce energy. Each MWh of availability is worth the difference between the 
economic value of the generator’s output and the incremental variable cost of its output. 
Ideally, the incentive for availability should reflect the actual economic value of energy 
on the system as a whole in any hour, but investors may prefer to limit their risk by 
defining contract availability payments which reflect prior estimates of the economic 
value.  
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3.3.1.3 Ancillary Services 
 
 
As well as the energy price and payments for availability, a PPA should also 
contain clauses on the following matters, which sometimes referred to as “ancillary 
services”: 
 
a) Performance of frequency control 
b) Provision of short term reserve generation (spinning or standing) 
c) Provision of voltage control (reactive power) 
d) Payments for emergency generation (incremental output above normal 
levels, or “black starts” after a system outages) 
 
 
The exact terms in these clauses will depend very much on conditions in each 
electricity system. Important considerations include, the cost providing the service; the 
value of the service to the system; and the ease with which output can be monitored. 
The terms of PPAs will also be affected by the terms implicit in any other technical 
agreements which impose obligations on generators or others. For example, all 
generators may have to provide frequency control as a condition of connecting to the 
network; further payment will not be required, unless the system operator wishes to 
encourage some generators to act more responsively than others. 
 
 
3.3.1.4 Other terms and conditions 
 
 
Finally, any PPA must include provision for a variety of other eventualities. A 
checklist of important technical issues might include: 
 
a) Any constraints on the flexibility of operating the generator; 
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b) Procedures for maintenance scheduling; 
c) Treatment of forced outages 
 
 
In addition, the PPA must allow for adjustment of the terms in the light of 
unforeseen events caused by others. Apart from a general force majeure clause, a PPA 
would normally refer to: 
 
a) Changes in the regulatory regime and any other documents (such as a 
grid code) which would materially affect the costs of the IPP; 
b) The length of contract and conditions for contract termination; 
c) Conditions for renegotiating the contract if any other conditions change. 
 
 
If the sum of energy payments, availability payments and earnings from the sale 
of ancillary services is not enough to cover the costs of the generator, then the case for 
building it is rather weak. The sum of energy, availability and ancillary service 
payments represents the plant’s total value to the system. If the payments do not cover 
the plant’s costs, the plant is not economic. However, government policy may require 
some additional cost to be incurred, e.g. for environmental reasons, or to support 
generators who use domestic fuel, or to locate generators in a particular region. The 
additional cost should be added to the fixed charge, so that it does not distort decisions 
about availability and output. 
 
 
In summary, negotiators must ensure that a PPA is designed in a way which 
encourages efficient operation and dispatch of the generator. Without the clear market 
price signals provided in a competitive system, this is a difficult task and many PPAs 
have been badly designed in ways which lead to gross inefficiency. However, the task is 
not impossible and examples of good PPAs are now found in a number of countries. 
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The benefits of designing PPAs efficiently have frequently been shown to justify the 
effort involved.  
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Installed Capacity and Generators Location 
 
 
The current peninsular Malaysia Installed Capacity as shown in Table 3.2, 
where TNB owns 7 thermal plants, and 9 hydro power plants, while IPPs contribute 
more than 70 percent of the installed capacity with 14 power plants. The summarized of 
peninsular Malaysia installed capacity as shown in Table 3.3. The Figure 3.2 shows the 
location of these generators. 
 
Table 3.2: List of individual TNB and IPP power plant 
No Power Plant Owner 
TNB / IPP 
Installed Capacity 
(MW) 
Type of Plant 
 
1. Stesen Janakuasa Sultan Ismail, Paka TNB 1006MW CCGT 
2. Stesen Janakuasa Sultan Iskandar, 
Pasir Gudang 
TNB 634MW CCGT, OC, 
Thermal 
3. Stesen Janakuasa Tuanku Jaafar, Port 
Dickson 
TNB 703MW CCGT 
4 Stesen Janakuasa Putrajaya, Serdang TNB 577MW OC 
5 Stesen Janakuasa Gelugor TNB 303MW CCGT 
6 Stesen Janakuasa Teluk Ewa TNB 62MW Thermal 
7 Stesen Janakuasa Jmbtn Connaught  TNB 756MW CCGT, OC, 
Thermal 
8 Stesen Hidroelektrik  Kenyir TNB 4x100MW Hydro 
9 Stesen Hidroelektrik Pergau TNB 4x150MW Hydro 
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10 Stesen Hidroelektrik Temenggor TNB 4x87MW Hydro 
11 Stesen Hidroelektrik Bersia TNB 3x24MW Hydro 
12 Stesen Hidroelektrik Kenering TNB 3x40MW Hydro 
13 Stesen Hidroelektrik Chenderoh TNB 3x9MW,7MW Hydro 
14 Stesen Hidroelektrik Upper Piah  TNB 2x7.3MW Hydro 
15 Stesen Hidroelektrik Lower Piah TNB 2x27MW Hydro 
16 Stesen-Stesen  Hidroelektrik  
Cameron Highland: 
(a) JOR 
(b) WOH 
(c) Odak 
(d) Habu 
(e) Kg. Raja 
(f) Kg. Terla 
(g) Robinson Falls 
TNB  
 
(a) 4x25MW 
(b) 3x50MW 
(c) 4.2MW 
(d) 5.5MW 
(e) 0.8MW 
(f) 0.5MW 
(g) 0.9MW 
Hydro 
17 YTL Power Generation Sdn. Bhd. IPP 3x390MW CCGT 
18 Genting Sanyen Power Sdn. Bhd. IPP 740MW CCGT 
19 Segari Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. IPP 1303MW CCGT 
20 Port Dickson Power Sdn. Bhd. IPP 4x109.1MW OC 
21 Powertek Berhad IPP 4x108.5MW OC 
22 Pahlawan Power Sdn. Bhd. IPP 322MW CCGT 
23 Panglima Power Sdn. Bhd. IPP 720MW CCGT 
24 GB3 Sdn. Bhd. IPP 640MW CCGT 
25 Teknologi Tenaga Perlis Consortium 
Sdn. Bhd. 
IPP 650MW CCGT 
26 Prai Power Sdn. Bhd. IPP 350MW CCGT 
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Table 3.3: Summarised of current Malaysia installed capacity (Peninsular) 
Generators Capacity (MW) 
TNB Generators (7) 4041 
TNB Hydro (9) 1904.50 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) (14) 14755.40 
Total 20700.90 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Generators Location in Peninsular Malaysia 
 
 
27 Kapar Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. IPP 2420MW OC, Thermal 
28 TNB Janamanjung Sdn. Bhd. IPP 3x690MW Thermal 
29 Tanjung Bin Power Sdn. Bhd. IPP 3x700MW Thermal 
30 Jimah Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. IPP 2x700MW Thermal 
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3.3.3 Economic Aspect of Single Buyer Model 
 
  
One of the objectives of restructuring is to promote a healthy competitive 
environment in the electricity trading. Trading in MESI, does not lead to transparent 
competition. This is due to the terms provided under the Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) between TNB and IPP. TNB acts as purchaser of the electricity while IPPs is the 
seller of electricity. In other words, TNB is a ready buyer of all generated electricity by 
IPPs and hence do not encourage transparent competition among the power producers. 
The IPPs has no choice to sell their output to other buyer except to TNB. This situation 
has reduced the opportunity for IPPs to supply directly to nearby industry and therefore, 
depend on assured single buyer, i.e. TNB for their revenues.  
 
 
TNB is legally responsible to cater all payment contracted in the PPA. The 
profits of many IPPs were reaping at the expense of TNB which suffered of massive 
profit erosion as a result of it payouts to IPP. In single buyer model, each of private 
producers gain their revenue based on the two types of payments rated in PPA which 
are capacity payment and energy payment. As stated in previous section, the capacity 
payment (RM/kW/month) is to cover the capital and other fixed costs which are not 
covered by the energy price per kWh. Meanwhile, the energy payment is the price paid 
per unit of incremental output. Therefore the mathematical equation which represented 
these types of payment can be written as: 
 
generator,each for Payment Capacity  
PriceCapacity Capacity Available ×=iG  
GiGii CPG ×=       (3.1) 
 
generator,each for Payment Energy  
PriceEnergy OutputPower ×=EiG  
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EGiEGiEi CPG ×=      (3.2) 
 
 
All IPPs were paid monthly based on these payments, depending on the price 
rate in each agreement except for YTL Corporation Sdn. Bhd. where payment is being 
paid by using energy price rate. This is due to a special deal that was made whereby 
80% of their installed capacity is being guaranteed to be bought by the TNB. All 
information regarding capacity and energy price rate for each IPPs are confidential. But, 
it is known that the duration of capacity price is the range of RM20/kW to RM40/kW 
and it depends on the type of generation for each power plant. 
 
 
Actually, there is a different between these two payments. One can conclude that 
the capacity payment is an unfair trading since payment is made regardless of electricity 
usage. But for energy payment, it is required because the generators are paid for the 
works that they have done. The price of capacity payment is fixed and TNB must pay 
regardless the usage. Meanwhile, the price of energy payment is based on the utilization 
of electricity per hour. Notice that, each of IPPs used different types of fuel to generate 
electricity and thus gave TNB variation price for capacity and energy payment. In order 
to make the concept clear, let consider an example of generation revenue for Tanjung 
Bin power plant in an hour.  
 
 
The installed capacity for Tanjung Bin power plant is 2100 MW. Let say the 
capacity price is RM 36/kW/month and energy price is RM200/MWh. For an hour, 
TNB used electricity has produced by Tanjung Bin about 1500 MW. For that particle of 
hour, TNB have to pay to Tanjung Bin; 
 
The capacity payment paid to the Tanjung Bin power plant for that hour;  
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0/hRM105000.01000
kWh2430
63RMMW2100 =×××=iG  
 
On the other hand, the energy payment paid to the Tanjung Bin power plant for 
that hour; 
 
000.00/h RM300RM200/MWh1500MW =×=EiG  
 
Therefore, the total revenue that Tanjung Bin had obtained for that purposed of 
hour is the summation of capacity and energy payment is equal to RM 405 000.00. The 
TNB is the one who obliged to pay the amount. 
 
 
From above example, it can be seen that the total generation revenue of all 
power producers involved in the single buyer model are able to be derived and the 
mathematical equation can be written as below: 
 
kT GGGG +++= ...21    (3.3) 
 ∑
=
=
k
i
iT GG
1
     (3.4)  
  ( ) ( )EGiEGiGiGii CPCPG ×+×=   (3.5)  
 
Thus,  
  ( ) ( )∑
=
×+×=
k
i
EGiEGiGiGiT CPCPG
1
][   (3.6)  
 
Where,  
PGi =  Power capacity available by ith generator in MW 
CGi = Capacity Price for ith generator in RM/MWh 
PEGi =  Power output generated by ith generator in MW 
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CEGi = Energy price for ith generator in RM/MWh 
k =  Numbers of generators involved 
GT = Total generation income in RM/h 
 
However, there are cases in the single buyer model where generators are only 
being paid using energy price without capacity price. Hence, during the analyzing 
process, capacity price is set to zero.  
 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Example of a simple Case Study 
 
 
A case study of four generators that supply three types of load demand is being 
used in order to detail out the explanations towards the trading in the single buyer 
model. Let us consider four generators G1, G2, G3 and G4 operating with the task of 
supplying two loads as shown in Figure 3.3. The three types of load demand included; 
the low demand which is 1500 MW; the medium demand which is 4000 MW and the 
high demand which is 5000 MW. Different types of demand are being used in order to 
see the effect of load variation towards the generator’s revenue. The transmission 
network is assumed to lossless and it is pure operations of energy markets. Each 
generator details on installed capacity and the rate of capacity and energy price are 
listed in Table 3.4. 
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Figure 3.3: Four generators with two loads 
  
 
Table 3.4: The detail information for each generator 
Gen. Available 
Capacity (MW) 
Capacity Contribution 
Range (MW) 
Capacity Price 
(RM/kW/month) 
Energy Price 
(RM/MWh) 
G1 650 1 - 650 36 000 120 
G2 2070 651 - 2720 36 000 140 
G3 2100 2721 - 4820 36 000 160 
G4 440 4821- 5260 36 000 180 
 
 
The Figure 3.4 shows the aggregated generation curve for the energy bidding 
process. The single buyer which is TNB will purchases power from the cheapest energy 
price according to the curve. Based on the capacity contribution range listed in Table 
3.4, the numbers of generators that involved in supplying the three types of demand can 
be determined. At the demand of 1500 MW, only G1 and G2 are succeeded to sell their 
output, but G3 and G4 failed. Meanwhile during the demand of 4000 MW is required, 
the three cheaper generators are able to get the business. Only at demand of 5000 MW, 
all generators are able to contribute to the demand and being paid based on the energy 
price. The capacity payments are paid fixedly regardless the selling process. 
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Figure 3.5: The energy payment obtained by each generator at different demand 
 
 
Each generator’s revenue prior to the types of demand is described in Figure 3.6. 
From the figure, an assumption of base load supplier will get the same amount of 
revenue throughout the day can be made. This is proven as the G1 manages to get the 
same revenue regardless the current demand. For G2, their revenue increased as the 
types of load change to medium and high load. On the other hand, the G3 had faced an 
incremental of revenue which is proportional to the incremental of current demand. As 
for G4, they get the lowest generation revenue compare to other generators. This can be 
seen in the Figure 3.7, whereby the total generation revenue of G4 for the three types of 
demand is the lowest among others. Meanwhile the intermediate price of generators 
which are the G2 and G3, get the first and second highest of total revenue. These figures 
might reflect the actual situation. 
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Figure 3.6: Each generator’s revenue at different demand 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Total generator’s revenue for all types of demand 
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3.3.5 Related Current Issues [12] 
 
 
The tug of war between Tenaga Nasional Berhad Sdn. Bhd. and the independent 
power producer is as old as the privatization exercise of the country’s power sector. It 
was the staggering financial crisis of the late 90s that brought to the surface the profits 
many of the IPPs were reaping at the expense of TNB which suffered massive profit 
erosion as a result of payouts to IPPs. Since then, the issue to renegotiate the IPPs have 
been widely debated and even pursued but of no avail. Energy Commission chairman 
even had mediated the talk between the TNB and IPPs but what had seemed promosing 
at the initial stages eventually turned stale mate. As it stands, electricity tariff have gone 
up for the end users. Tenaga Nasional is also hit by fuel cost. The government is bearing 
the burden of rising cost due to the subsidies. But IPPs are not sharing any of these 
burdens.   
 
 
 Recently, the assumption of these IPPs able to make big revenues has led the 
government to impose a windfall tax on IPPs without going through their financial 
position. The more to cut IPPs with a special windfall recently has drawn protest from 
Penjanabebas (an association of 14 IPPs). The windfall tax will be 30% of earnings 
before interest tax (EBIT) that is above the 9% threshold on return on asset (POA). 
Penjana bebas warned that the levy could effect their ability to meet their loan 
obligation. 
  
 
 The IPP issues bond to raise capital to finance its obligations. When the 
government implements windfall tax, rating agencies (RAM) review the rating based on 
their new cash flow positions. Number of them has a negative cash flow with the 
implementation of the new windfall tax. Due to the negative cash flow position, quite a 
number of IPPs rating has been downgraded. This has led the unhappiness among the 
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IPP because the windfall tax has caused the negative cash flow position of their 
company.  
 
 
 Later on, the government’s move to impose a one year windfall tax payment and 
suspend the power purchase agreement (PPA) is positive for the independent power 
producers (IPPs). On 11th September 2008, the Cabinet said the government had 
discontinued the windfall profit levy on IPPs with immediate effect. IPPs would instead 
have to make one-off payment equivalent to the windfall profit levy payable for one 
year. Figure 3.8 shows some paper cuttings with regards to windfall tax. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Paper cuttings regards to windfall tax issue 
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 As for TNB, while it was unable to share the burden of rising coal cost with the 
IPPs, it is believed TNB would be compensated for the suspension of PPA negotiation 
with other forms of relief such as subsidy or tariff adjustment come in July 1, 2009 (the 
date for next review on pegged gas cost). 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of SBM 
 
 
There several advantages and disadvantages in applying the single buyer model 
[13]. The popularity of the single buyer model is due to a number of technical, 
economic, and institutional factors, such as:  
 
a) Single buyer model can facilitates the balancing between supply and 
demand in each seconds as it has the exclusive rights to buy and sell 
electricity 
b) Single buyer model does not require third party access in transmission as 
there is no contractual arrangements for electricity to flow along the 
network 
c) In Single buyer model, the sector ministry is obligated to fully decide on 
the investments in generation capacity, which is easier to cater 
d) Single buyer model helps to maintain a unified wholesale electricity 
price, simplifying price regulation 
e) Single buyer model makes it possible to shield financiers of generation 
projects from market risk and retail-level regulatory risk, reducing 
financing costs or making the investment commercially bankable 
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On the other hand, the major downside of the single buyer model is particularly 
in countries with weak or corrupt government and low payment discipline. The other 
disadvantages in applying the single buyer model are: 
 
a) Government has the authority in made decision about adding generation 
capacity. Therefore, there has been an upward bias in the generation 
capacity procured under both the single-buyer and the IPP models which 
might invite corruptions  
b) Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) that ensure the safety of investors 
had created a contingent liability for the government, which can 
undermine the government’s creditworthiness and, ultimately, 
macroeconomic stability if it is unmanageable. This is regarding to the 
burden payment that have to be paid by the government 
c) Under the single buyer model, wholesale electricity prices rise because 
fixed capacity charges must be spread over a shrinking volume of 
electricity purchases. When these high prices cannot be passed on to 
final consumers, taxpayers must bear the losses 
d) Single buyer model hampers the development of cross-border electricity 
trade by leaving it to the single buyer, a state-owned company without a 
strong profit motive.  
e) The single buyer model weakens the incentives for distributors to collect 
payments from customers 
f) The single buyer model makes it so easy for governments to intervene in 
the dispatch of generators and the allocation of cash proceeds among 
them that few are able to resist the temptation 
g) The single buyer model increases the likelihood that, under pressure 
from vested interests, governments will indefinitely delay the next step 
toward fully liberalized electricity markets 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
A POOL BASED MARKET DESIGN FOR MESI 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
As explained earlier in Chapter 3, the current model applied in MESI does not 
provide any transparent competition as it supposed to. Furthermore, TNB is contracted 
to pay the monthly capacity price to the IPP for a long term period. This chapter 
proposes a competitive market model which is based on the pool market model. This 
market model is the most suitable model to be applied based on MESI current structure 
and it is already drafted in the MESI plan towards restructuring.    
 
  
 The pool market model offers two types of market settlement which are single 
auction and double auction power pool. On the other hand, the pricing scheme which 
can be applied in the pool market model consists of two; i.e. uniform price which based 
on the system marginal price and pay as bid which is based on the generator’s energy 
bid price. This study focus on the economic aspect from the perspective of the 
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generators, the proposed model is being designed in order to overcome several 
disadvantages of the pure pool market.   
 
 
 
 
4.2 Overview of Pool Market Model 
 
 
In pool market model all energy supply is controlled and coordinated by a single 
pool operator who is normally known as independent market operator (IMO). There are 
two main sides of entities participating in the market, which are producers/supplier and 
customers/consumers. The IMO will consider the electricity bids and offers from these 
two entities to dispatch them in an economic manner depending on submitted bidding 
price and MW capacity [14]. This market model is depicted in Figure 4.1. The 
customers and suppliers do not interact to each other, but indirectly interact through the 
IMO. The IMO is responsible for both market settlement including scheduling and 
dispatch, and the transmission system management including transmission pricing and 
security aspects. 
 
 
Basically, the pool market operation can be divided into two stages [8]. The first 
stage is called unconstrained dispatch and the second stage is called security constrained 
dispatch. During unconstrained dispatch, generators are placed in an ascending order 
according to their bid prices without considering any system constraints. A number of 
the least expensive generators are selected for dispatching to meet system predicted 
demands. The selected generators are called in-merit generators while the remaining 
generators are called out-merit generators. The bid price of the last dispatched 
generators determines the system marginal price (SMP). Next, the IMO evaluate if 
transmission constraint would occur under the unconstrained dispatch. If there is no 
constraint violation, the dispatch obtained from the unconstrained dispatch stage is 
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executed. If there is constraint violation, the IMO would re-dispatch the generators 
using security constrained dispatch. This can cause some out-of merit generators are 
dispatched to replace in-merit generators. The cost of this action contributes to uplift 
charge and is added to energy price.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Electricity Trading; Pool Market Model 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Pool Market Price Determination 
 
 
The market clearing price represents the price of one additional MWh of energy 
and is therefore called the system marginal price or SMP. Generators are paid this SMP 
for every MWh that they produce, whereas consumers pay the SMP for every MWh that 
they consume, irrespective of the bids and offers that they submitted. In Pool system, 
there will be three prices involved. All generators and customers are obliged to follow 
these prices.  
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a)  System Marginal Price (SMP) 
 
 This is the half hourly price derived from the offer price of the most expensive 
flexible generating unit scheduled in each half hour in the unconstrained schedule. This 
generating unit is known as the marginal set. 
 
b) Pool Purchase Price (CPP) 
 
This price includes the System Marginal Price and is the actual price paid to the 
generator which can be calculated by: 
 
CPP = SMP (1-LOLP) + VOLL (LOLP) (4.1) 
 Where, 
 
LOLP is the Loss of Load Probability which is the probability of supply being 
lost by reason of the generation available being insufficient to meet demand. VOLL on 
the other hand, is the Value of Lost Load is the maximum price the supply of electricity 
demand is deemed to be worth. It is a value that is fixed annually.  
 
c) Pool Selling Price (CSP) 
 
An element called uplift is added to the Pool Purchase Price, to produce Pool 
Selling Price. Uplift reflects the difference between the cost of the Unconstrained 
Schedule and cost of on the day operation. PSP is calculated by:  
 
UpliftCC PPSP +=     (4.2)   
dTotalDeman
stSecurityCoCC PPSP +=    (4.3) 
 
 Where, 
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Uplift is the cost of providing ancillary services (AS) or other network 
operation. These ancillary services can include costs to procure MVAr, load following, 
maintenance services, black start capabilities. Other than that, the security cost relates 
with the contingencies during load dispatch. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Contracts for Difference in Pool Market 
 
 
Producers and consumers of some commodities are sometimes obliged to trade 
solely through a centralized market. Since they are not allowed to enter into bilateral 
agreements, they do not have the option to use forward, future or option contracts to 
reduce their exposure to price risks. In such situations, parties often resort to contracts 
for difference that operate in parallel with the centralized market. In a contract for 
difference, the parties agree on a strike price and an amount of the commodity. They 
then take part in the centralized market like all other participants. Once trading on the 
centralized market is complete, the contract for difference is settled as follows [2]: 
 
a) If the strike price agreed in the contract is higher than the centralized market 
price, the buyer pays the seller the difference between these two prices times the 
amount agreed in the contract. 
b) If the strike price is lower than the market price, the seller pays the buyer the 
difference between these two prices times the agreed amount 
 
 
 A contract for difference thus insulates the parties from the price on the 
centralized market while allowing them to take part in this market. A contract for 
difference can be described as a combination of a call option and a put option with the 
  
63
same exercise price. Unless the market price is exactly equal to the strike price, one of 
these options will necessarily be exercised.  
 
 
4.2.2.1 Example of Contract for Different (CFD) 
 
 
Let us consider a case whereby the rules of the Malaysian electricity market 
insist that all participants must trade energy exclusively through the Power Pool. 
However, the Malaysia Aluminum Company (MALCo) and the Malakoff Power 
Company (MAPCo) have signed contract for difference for the delivery of 200MW on a 
continuous basis at a strike price of RM16/MWh. Three observations on the flow of 
power and the transaction between these companies are being done based on the 
following cases: 
 
 
a) The pool price takes the following values: RM16/MWh, RM18/MWh 
and RM13/MWh. 
b) During one hour the Malakoff Power Company is able to deliver only 
50MWh and the pool price is RM18/MWh 
c) During one hour the Malaysia Aluminum Company consumes only 
100MWh and the pool price is RM13/MWh 
 
 
Based on the contract for different concept explained previously, the three cases 
have been solved and summarized in Table 4.1. This table includes the flow of power 
and the transaction between these two companies.  
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Table 4.1: The power flow and the transaction for an hour 
 CPP 
(RM/MWh) 
MAPCo MALCo 
a) 
16 
Produces 200 MW and Receives 
RM 3200 from the pool 
Consumes 200 MW and Pays  
RM 3200 to the pool 
18 
Produces 200 MW, Receives RM 
3600 from the pool and Pays RM 
400 to MALCo 
Consumes 200 MW, Pays    RM 
3600 to the pool and Receives 
RM 400 from MAPCo 
13 
Produces 200 MW, Receives RM 
2600 from the pool and Receives 
RM 600 from MALCo 
Consumes 200 MW, Pays    RM 
2600 to the pool and Pays RM 
600 to MAPCo 
b) 
18 
Produces 50 MW, Receives   RM 
900 from the pool and Pays RM 
400 to MALCo 
Consumes 200 MW, Pays    RM 
3600 to the pool and Receives 
RM 400 from MAPCo 
c) 
13 
Produces 200 MWh, Receives 
RM 2600 from the pool and 
Receives RM 600 from MALCo 
Consumes 100 MWh, Pays  
RM 1300 to the pool and Pays 
RM 600 to MAPCo 
 
 
 
4.3 Market settlement strategies 
 
 
In Pool, the structure can adopt any of the following two market settlement 
strategies. It could be either market settlement by maximization of social welfare or 
market settlement by minimization of consumer payment. The first market settlement 
strategy is more famous and yet it applied two types of auction which are Single 
Auction Power Pools and Double Auction Power Pools [15]. However, the adoption of 
any market settlement is based on the local conditions and the structure in electricity 
supply industry (ESI) of a country itself.  
 
  
65
A first characteristic of a market settlement is the nature of supply and demand 
bids. Single auction power pools refer to strategies where only supply is based on bids 
and demand is estimated. Meanwhile, double auction power pool allows both supply 
and demand to be based on bids from participants. Commodities markets are usually 
organized according to the double auction. In short, the market settlement aggregates 
supply and demand bids and the intersection of the two curves defines the market price. 
However, in electricity markets demand participation may be difficult to obtain from a 
practical point of view. Most consumers of electricity have a low level of 
responsiveness to price increases. For this reason some market settlement uses estimates 
of demand rather than bids from consumers. This was formally the case in the United 
Kingdom pool. The pool estimated demand for each period based on historical records 
and this then allowed a pool price to be determined. Single auction are obviously not an 
ideal mechanism for determining optimal market prices. Their only justification is 
practical, when introducing market mechanisms, in particular during the start-up phase, 
they can be a good way to determine a market price, and however a lack of direct 
demand participation strongly limits the value of this.  
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Single Auction Power Pools 
 
 
In this market settlement, the customers or distributor company can be assumed 
as one company only. The competition only valid among generator companies and 
customer does not know which generators those succeed to sell their output. The market 
structure for one sided pool is shown in Figure 4.2. The red lines indicate the electrical 
energy that flows from the generation to the distribution companies with the transaction 
is through a single pool operator.  
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Figure 4.2: One sided pool market structure 
 
 
Generator companies submit bids to supply a certain amount of electrical energy 
at a certain price for the period under consideration. These bids are ranked in order of 
increasing price. Meanwhile, the demand curve is predicted to be a vertical line at the 
value of the load forecast. The highest priced bid that intersects with the demand 
forecast determines the market price which applied for whole system as depicted in 
Figure 4.3. This arrangement is found in Australian system.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Market settlement in one sided pool  
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4.3.1.1 Application of Single Auction Power Pools in MESI 
 
 
In single auction power pool, the market settlement only requires a distribution 
company or customer. Hence, it is easier for Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry 
(MESI) as the distribution and transmission industry is dominated by Tenaga Nasional 
Berhad Transmission and Distribution (TNBD) itself. At the moment, it is suggested 
that the TNB will act as the single pool operator. In this pool market the Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad Generation (TNBG) beside hydro power plants will get involved in the 
competition with other IPPs. The suggested single auction structure is shown in Figure 
4.4. Red lines indicate the electricity energy that flows from the generation to the 
distribution companies. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The structure of single auction power pool in MESI 
 
 
First of all, the distributor company will announce the forecast load demand to 
the pool operator a day ahead before real time. Then, TNB as the single pool operator 
will start to receive the generators bid price and available capacity for that moment. 
This means that the bid price might be volatile from time to time depending on the 
demand and the current fuel cost. In spite of this, TNBG and IPPs will compete to bid 
the lowest bid price so that each of them manages to sell their output for particular hour. 
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68
The higher bid price will less the opportunity to get incomes. As the existing MESI 
structure is almost like single auction, hence, all design in this study is based on this 
market strategy.  
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Double Auction Power Pools 
 
 
In this market settlement, there are several customers or more than one 
distributor companies. This is because the competition is not only valid among 
generator companies but also valid among the customers. However, each market 
participants does not know which generators and customers those succeed to sell and 
bought the electrical energy. The market structure for double auction power pool is 
shown in Figure 4.5. The red lines indicate the electrical energy that flows from 
generation to the distributor companies with the transaction through the single pool 
operator. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Double auction power pool market structure 
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In more sophisticated, the demand curve of the market can be established by 
asking buyers to submit offers specifying quantity and price and ranking these offers in 
decreasing order of price. The intersection of these constructed supply and demand 
curves represents the market equilibrium, refer Figure 4.6. All the bids submitted at a 
price lower than or equal to the market clearing price are accepted and generators are 
instructed to produce the amount of energy corresponding to their accepted bids. 
Similarly, all the offers submitted at a price greater than or equal to the market clearing 
price are accepted and the consumers are informed of the amount of energy that they are 
allowed to draw from the system. This market settlement strategy is used in New 
Zealand, California and NordPool (Norway, Sweeden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland) 
markets. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Market settlement in double auction power pool 
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4.3.2.1 Application of Double Auction Power Pools in MESI 
 
 
 This market settlement provides competition not only among the generators but 
also among the customers. To compete, the distribution company should be more than 
one. Therefore, it is suggested that private Distributor Companies (DistCo) beside 
TNBD are being introduced in MESI. It can be built based on region and this can 
reduce the effect of transmission loss as well. Figure 4.7 illustrates the double auction 
power pool structure that can be applied in MESI. Red lines indicate the electricity 
trading that flows from the generation to the distributors companies. 
 
 
 The supply side which is IPPs and TNBG submit their bid (the amount and 
associate price) for selling energy to the pool, while the demand side which is the 
TNBD and private distributor company submits their offer for buying energy from pool. 
The system price is obtained by stacking the supply bids in increasing order of their 
prices and demand bids in decreasing order of their prices. The system price and 
amount of energy cleared for trading is obtained from the intersection of these curves as 
explained previously. 
 
 
  
Figure 4.7: The structure of double auction power pool in MESI 
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As the structure and introduction of private distributor company is still far from 
MESI current structure, this market settlement is only in suggested model and will be 
not considered in the case study for the project. Perhaps that one day, the Malaysian 
Government will permit the introduction private distribution company in looking 
forwards for wholesale market model.  
 
 
 
 
4.4 Pricing Scheme: Pay as Bid and Uniform Price 
 
 
Uniform pricing scheme is one of the concepts in the pure pool market model 
before pay as bid scheme concept is being introduced due to some flaws occurred. The 
controversy over uniform pricing and pay as bid pricing centers on the distribution of 
the surplus and was first addressed in the United States with the treasury auction. Both 
of a theoretical and from an empirical point of view, definitive ranking of the uniform 
price scheme and pay as bid scheme is still an open question. In the uniform pricing 
scheme, all suppliers get paid the price of the system marginal price (SMP). Hence, all 
suppliers who bid lower prices get an extra profit called a surplus. In the same way all 
consumers who bid higher prices pay a lower price than the one they were willing to 
pay, this is called the consumer surplus, Figure 4.8 is being referred. The mathematical 
presentative of these two types of pricing scheme are shown in below sub section in 
order to detail out the effect of these scheme towards generators as the seller and 
customers as the buyer. 
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of surplus (assuming same bidding behaviours) 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Uniform Price (UP) Scheme 
 
 
In this pricing scheme, all generators are being paid based on the pool purchase 
price, CPP which is effected by the system marginal price (SMP) regardless to their 
energy bid price. Therefore, the mathematical equation for each generator that being 
paid using the uniform scheme can be written as: 
 
PPGii CPG ×=     (4.4) 
 
 
Let us consider a case of a power plant named Tanjung Bin, which has 2100MW 
for it installed capacity and their energy bid price is RM 150/MWh. Let say, for an 
hour, Tanjung Bin succeed to sell their output up to the maximum and the current pool 
purchase price is RM 250/MWh. For a uniform pricing scheme, the Tanjung Bin will be 
paid RM 250 for that hour regardless the energy bid price. 
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From a consumer point of view it might appear unfair that a supplier who is 
willing to supply at a price of RM 150/MWh receives the pool purchase price at 
RM250MWh. Because of this issue had arise, it has been suggested that pay as bid 
methodology, previously experimented with the United States Treasury’s auction 
experiment, should be implemented in electricity markets to increase the consumer 
surplus and eliminate these “unfair profits”. In a pay as bid scheme, suppliers get paid 
the price they bid. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Pay as Bid (PAB) Scheme 
 
 
In this pricing scheme, the generators are being paid according to their energy 
bid price regardless the pool purchase price, CPP. Therefore, the mathematical equation 
for each generator that being paid using the pay as bid scheme can be written as: 
 
 GiPaBGiPaBPaBi CPG ×=    (4.5) 
 
Let us consider the same case in section 4.4.1. For a pay as bid pricing scheme, 
the Tanjung Bin will be paid RM 150 for that hour instead of RM250.  
 
 
Hence, from a generator point of view, the pay as bid scheme appears to be less 
attractive while it in theory it allows consumers to pay the right price. However in a pay 
as bid scheme in an imperfect market generators have a strong incentive to increase the 
level of their bids in order to ensure a minimum level of profit. Instead of submit bid 
price that reflects their marginal costs, suppliers will tend to bid what they think will be 
the market clearing price. Such behavior will lead to an increase in bids and will distort 
the system. 
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Marginal costs for some technology, and especially for base load plant, are 
almost zero (nuclear for instance). If players bid their true marginal costs they will not 
be able to recover their fixed costs. This will deter entry and involve less investment in 
base load power plants thus reducing the overall efficiency of the system. It can also be 
argued that from a supplier’s point of view that pay as bid can also be implemented in 
the other way, i.e. consumers have to pay the price they were willing to pay.  
 
 
In addition, pay as bid reduce transparency by creating many prices instead of 
one price in the marginal price system. It have shown that in some cases uniform price 
scheme are superior compare to pay as bid scheme in mitigating market power as they 
allow competitive arbitrageurs to outbid generators where generators may otherwise 
secure inter-connector capacity that amplifies their market power. Thus for all these 
reasons, marginal price appears as more suitable than pay-as-bid. Table 4.2 shows the 
comparison between Pay as Bid (PAB) scheme and Uniform Price (UP) in term of its 
advantages and disadvantages from the economic aspect point of view. 
 
 
Table 4.2: The advantages and disadvantages for PAB and UP 
 Pay as Bid (PAB) Uniform Price (UP) 
Advantages - It can reduce the effect of market 
power exercise  
- Seller with less bid price able to 
get extra incomes in high 
demand 
Disadvantages - Seller will not submit bid that 
reflect their marginal cost of 
production 
- The expensive generators cannot 
participate in low demand trading 
- The amount of SMP is 
dependent on demand 
- Possibility in market power 
exercise  
- The expensive generators cannot 
participate in low demand  
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4.5 Economic Aspect of Pool Market Model 
 
 
From previous equation of the generator revenue for each types of scheme, the 
mathematical equation that represents the total generation revenue for pool market 
model can be written as following. The mathematical equation for total generation 
revenue, GT of pool market model with the uniform price scheme can be written as: 
 
∑
=
=
k
i
iT GG
1
     (4.6)  
 
From equation 4.1 and 4.4, the total generation revenue for this market model 
thus equal to, 
  
  ( )∑
=
×=
k
i
PPGiT CPG
1
    (4.7) 
 
Where,  
PGi =  Power capacity available by ith generator to the pool in MW 
CPP = Pool Purchase Price in RM/MWh 
k =  Numbers of generators involved 
GT = Total generation income in RM/h 
 
On the other hand, the mathematical equation that represents the total generation 
revenues, GT of pool market model with the pay as bid scheme can be written as:  
 
∑
=
=
k
i
PaBiT GG
1
     (4.8)  
 
From equation 4.5, the total generation revenue for this market model thus equal 
to, 
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 ( )∑
=
×=
k
i
GiPaBGiPaBT CPG
1
   (4.9) 
 
Where,  
PGiPaB = Power capacity generated by ith generator to in MW 
CGiPaB = Bid Price for ith generation in RM/MWh 
k = Numbers of generators involved 
GT = Total generation income in RM/h 
 
 
 
 
4.5.1 Example of a Simple Case Study 
 
 
The same example and data in the previous simple case study in Section 3.3.4 is 
being used in order to explain the difference between the pool market model with either 
uniform pricing and pay as bid pricing scheme. Only energy price rate will be taken into 
account as in pool trading model, the business is based on the competition among 
generators. Generators will submit their bid price (energy price) and only the least 
generators are able to sell their output. This situation can create competition among 
generators as each of them try to be the cheapest generators. As a result, the value of 
energy price will be not fixed as previous case study and the rate might be varies from 
time to time depending on the current market situation. Therefore, in this example, the 
value of capacity price has been included into the energy price in hourly basis so that 
the value will be more reasonable.  
 
 
In order to detail out which generators that able to sell the output, a table which 
summarized the succeeded generators at all types of demand can be referred at Table 
4.3. Note that, the numbers of generators that succeeded remain the same for all types of 
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market, however, the major different are based on the amount of revenues that they 
obtained. Detail calculation for both uniform price and pay as bid scheme in this 
example can be referred to the APPENDIX B. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Generators that succeeded is being ● 
Gen Low Demand Medium Demand High Demand 
G1 ● ● ● 
G2 ● ● ● 
G3 - ● ● 
G4 - - ● 
 
 
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 describe the revenue obtained by each generator 
which is based on uniform price scheme and pay as bid scheme respectively. For both 
types of scheme, only the energy price is being considered and totally neglected the 
capacity price. It can be observed G4 unable for get any income at all for both low and 
medium demand. Meanwhile, the G3 manage to obtain an income for each types of load 
except for the low demand. This means that by applying pool market model which is 
based only on the energy price, the expensive generators will be unable to obtain 
revenues at low demand whereas this generator only get income during high demand.  
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Figure 4.9: The generation revenues based on UP at different demand 
 
 
From these figures, it can be seen that the amount of revenue that gain by 
generators for uniform price are higher than the amount of revenue that based on pay as 
bid scheme. This is because in pool market with uniform price, each succeeded 
generators will be paid based on the pool purchase price, which on the other hand varies 
with the demand. Meanwhile, the payment in pay as bid is based on each generators bid 
price. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: The generation revenues based on PAB at different demand 
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Figure 4.11 describes total generator’s revenue for all types of demand. It shows that 
G2, as the second least energy price manage to obtain the highest revenue among the 
others. This is because the generators manage to sell their output most of the time and 
yet their bid price is more expensive compare to G1. On the other hand, G4 only 
manage to obtain the revenue during peak hours which will hurt their incomes.  
  
 
Figure 4.11: Total generator’s revenues for all types of demand based on PAB and UP 
 
  
 
 
4.6 Issue Arise due to Pool Market model  
 
 
 From the previous example, it can be seen that the pool market model can 
promote competition among the generators. However, it comes along with some 
problem and few issues. This is because the implementation of any types of market 
model is being influenced of the local condition of a country itself.  Therefore, there are 
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three main issues could be raised up when the pool trading model is applied in MESI, 
such as:- 
 
a) Generators with higher energy bid price have less opportunity to sell their 
output. These expensive generators will not be able to contribute its capacity to 
demand most of the time especially during low demand. Because of there is no 
capacity payment, some generator will not obtained any revenue at certain hour. 
b) TNB itself own different types of power plants and majority of these power 
plants are not so efficient due to ageing, this could increase the marginal cost of 
production and as a result the TNB have less opportunity to sell their output due 
to higher marginal price 
c) There are possibilities of having market power exercise in pool trading model. 
For example, big power producers companies could monopoly the market by 
arranging several bidding strategies which may effect the stability of electricity 
market and rise up the market risks [1]  
 
 
In order to overcome these issues and improve the pool market model, a hybrid 
trading model is being introduced. This proposed model consist of pool market model 
which supported by several market policies in order to accommodate a fair competitive 
trading and produce win-win situation to not only the TNB and the IPP but also to the 
customers. This is due to the fact that the consumers are affected from the market price. 
These market policies which can be regulated by the Energy Commission (EC) aim to 
reduce the exercise of market power and market risks.  
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4.6.1 Solution of issued; Suggested Market Policies 
 
 
Energy Commission (EC) is a government body who is responsible to draft the 
regulation for MESI. One of the regulations that can be made is regarding the market 
policies which can overcome several issues arise when the pool market model is being 
applied in MESI. The suggested market policies that possible to be endorsed by the 
Energy Commission (EC) are written as follows. 
 
 
a) Hydro power plants  
 
Hydro power plants will not participate in the bidding process but it is given a 
special treatment [16]. In addition, hydro power plant usually are used for backup and to 
cater the peak load 
 
b) Guaranteed revenues for base load demand 
 
In order to ensure the participation of all power producers in selling  their output 
throughout the day, the identified base load demand for each load profile will be shared 
among all power producers is being introduced. The concept is lesson learnt from 
competitive electricity market in Singapore [17] 
 
c) Trading is only valid for high load demand 
 
There is a very large variation in liquidity (the percentage of total consumption 
which is traded through the market) between different markets. This varies from 0 to 
100 percent depending on the market structure. Markets such as in the Brazil and Czech 
traded the electricity up to 5% on the short term market while in Korea 100% is traded 
on the market. Meanwhile, in Australia 100% is traded on the market but in the order of 
80% is covered by contracts for different. These figures are influenced by the market 
model in the countries [15]. Therefore, in the proposed model it is suggested that the 
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electricity that will be traded and pass through the bidding process in pool market model 
is introduced only for high load demand.  
 
d) The reduction of market power exercise 
 
The market power exercise can be reduced as a part of their installed capacity 
has been used to supply the base load. This can reduce their ability to monopoly the 
pool market with certain bidding strategies. They also did not have the opportunity to 
play around with the market price as the system marginal price will be always at 
intermediate value. It is base on the electricity that being traded is only for peak load. 
 
e) Application of pay as bid or uniform pricing scheme for the electricity trading 
 
As there are two types of pricing scheme; i.e. uniform price and pay as bid 
scheme, the single pool operator may choose either one from these schemes which will 
enhance the benefit for each market participants  
 
 
Finally, the proposed model which namely as hybrid model will be the 
combination the matter in b) and c). This proposed model is believed would be able to 
overcome the issues arise in pool market model. Each generator is being guaranteed to 
be able to obtain revenue at each hour. This also can be reduced the effect of market 
power exercise as the electricity is only being traded during high load demand. 
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4.7 Hybrid Model 
 
 
Despite applying the pure pool market model, a hybrid model which includes 
the pool market model with several policies is believed to be the most significant 
market model for MESI. This hybrid market model provide competition environment 
which guaranteed revenue for each generator without taken into account the types of 
demand and the generator’s energy bid price. This model also able to reduce the effect 
of market power exercise as the traded electricity will be only held during the high load 
demand. As a result, a market model which can provide win-win situation to all market 
participants including the end-consumers can be achieved. The end-consumers will pay 
a reasonable electricity tariff, the power producers will obtained reasonable profit as for 
TNB as well as IPP. 
 
 
 The hybrid model which combines the pure pool market and pro-rata base load 
profile has the following properties: 
 
a) Base load demand 
 
As mentioned in previous section, the base load sharing is being introduced in 
order to allow all generators will get their revenue regardless the current demand and 
their energy bid price. A pro-rata basis approach has been used in order to divide the 
base load fairly to all power producers. Note that, the portions of supply that obtain by 
each generator will proportional with their available capacity. This means that big 
generators will participate more in supplying the base load demand. Therefore, the 
mathematical equation that represents each generator’s portion of supplying the base 
load demand can be written as; 
 
Demand Load Base
1
×=
∑
=
k
i
Gi
Gi
GiBL
P
P
P    (4.10) 
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 As a result, all generators are able to sell their output regardless their energy bid 
price and the current demand. This has solved the problem whereby the generators with 
expensive bid price could not gain any revenue during low demand. In addition, it can 
reduce the effect of market power exercise which tries to manipulate the system 
marginal price in pool trading model. This is because a part of their capacity has been 
used to supply the base load; therefore this will reduce their ability to conquer the 
market. The mathematical equation for generator’s revenue from the base load demand 
which is valid for both types of pricing scheme can be written as:  
 
GPaBGiBLiBL CPG ×=      (4.11) 
 
Where, 
PGiBL =  Power capacity generated under pro-rata basis for ith generator in MW 
CGPaB = Price based bid for ith generator  in RM/MWh 
 
 
b) High load demand  
 
The remaining capacity from each generator is traded in the pure pool market 
model. As the remaining capacity for each generator is less, hence it is difficult for big 
generators to monopoly the market. Moreover, the system marginal price can be 
reduced due to less remaining demand required for the pool market model. The 
mathematical equation that will represent the generator’s revenue from the high load 
demand is based on the types of pricing scheme that being used. If the uniform price 
scheme is being used, the mathematical equation for generator’s revenue from the high 
load demand can be written as:  
 
PPGii CPG ×=     (4.12) 
 
Where,  
PGi = Remaining power capacity of ith generator; satisfy the pool demand in MW 
CPP = Pool Purchase Price in RM/MWh 
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Meanwhile, if the pay as bid scheme is being used, the mathematical equation 
for generator’s revenue from the high load demand can be written as:  
 
GiPaBGii CPG ×=     (4.13) 
 
Where, 
CGiPaB = Price based bid for ith generator  in RM/MWh 
PGi = Remaining power capacity of ith generator; satisfy the pool demand 
in MW 
 
 
Therefore, the mathematical equation for total generation revenue for the hybrid 
model with uniform price scheme is consists of equation for 4.11 for base load and 4.12 
for high load demand will then produce an equation of: 
 
( ) ( )∑
=
×+×=
k
i
PPGiGPaBGiBLT CPCPG
1
  (4.14) 
 
Where, 
PGiBL =  Power capacity generated under pro-rata basis for ith generator in MW 
PGi = Remaining power capacity of ith generator; satisfy the pool demand in 
MW 
CPP = Pool Purchase Price in RM/MWh 
CGiPaB = Price based bid for ith generator  in RM/MWh 
k =  Numbers of generators involved 
GT = Total generation income in RM/h 
 
 
On the other hand, the mathematical equation for total generation revenue for 
the hybrid model with pay as bid scheme which consists of equation 4.11 for base load 
and 4.13 for high load demand can be written as: 
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( ) ( )∑
=
×+×=
k
i
GiPaBGiGPaBGiBLT CPCPG
1
 (4.15) 
 
Where, 
PGiBL =  Power capacity generated under pro-rata basis for ith generator in MW 
CGiPaB = Price based bid for ith generator  in RM/MWh 
PGi = Remaining power capacity of ith generator; satisfy the pool demand in 
MW 
k =  Numbers of generators involved 
GT = Total generation income in RM/h 
 
 
The market policies and hybrid model are designed consequently in order to 
produce a fair market between the generators companies (TNB and IPP) and the 
distributor company as well as the end-consumers. With this model, the generations 
company manage to sell their output regardless the current demand as each of them 
contribute for the base load demand. Meanwhile, the customer can pay less for the 
remaining load demand as the system marginal price is getting lower. The proposed 
model which is designed for one sided pool market settlement is analyzed in the case 
study in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
4.7.1 Example of a simple case study 
 
 
The same example and data in the previous case study in Section 3.3.4 is being 
used in order to prove the advantages of applying the hybrid model compare to pure 
pool trading model. Both pricing scheme are being used; i.e. uniform pricing and pay as 
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bid pricing scheme. Same as example in pool trading model, only energy price rate will 
be taken into account as it is based on the competition among generators, this time the 
trading only valid during peak load. The value of energy price is assumed to remain the 
same both each types of load whereas in practical, the rate might be vary from time to 
time. The situation can create competition among generators as each of them try to be 
the least generators. The base load demand is identified as 1000MW for each types of 
load demand. 
 
 
In this example, all generators able to contribute for the base load demand and 
their contribution prior the available capacity is listed in Table 4.4, equation of 4.10 is 
being used. This shows that each generator is guaranteed of its revenue and is proven in 
Figure 4.12, for uniform price scheme and Figure 4.13, for pay as bid scheme. Detail 
calculation for both uniform price and pay as bid scheme in this example can be 
referred to the APPENDIX C. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Each generator’s contribution for base and high load demand 
Gen 
Available 
Capacity  
Base Load 
Demand 
High Load 
Demand 
G1 650 123.57 526.43 
G2 2070 393.54 1676.46 
G3 2100 399.24 1700.76 
G4 440 83.65 356.35 
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Figure 4.12: Each generator’s revenue based on uniform price at different demand 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Each generator’s revenue based on pay as bid at different demand 
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4.8 Types of Operating Pool Market 
 
  
A pool can operate a day-ahead market (e.g. the former England and Wales 
Pool) or close to real time market (e.g. five minutes-ahead). There can also be a 
combination of several markets (day-ahead, intra-day and five minutes-ahead). Where a 
five-minutes-ahead market is operated, other sessions can still be run on the basis of 
non-firm offers and bids. Such sessions are used to create a forecast of the market prices 
as an indication for the market participants. Such price seeking sessions are based on 
non-firm offers and bids and are important to allow for non-dispatched demand side 
response in case of high market prices.  
 
 
Day-ahead markets and real time markets are often confused since they are often 
regrouped under the term “spot market”. However, this thesis defined the spot market as 
the day ahead market, which can be organized bilaterally or/and on a marketplace. The 
real time market refers to real power balancing by the system operator. Due to the high 
transaction cost involved in bilateral day-ahead trading, the day-ahead market is usually 
organized on a marketplace. The real-time market or balancing market is always an 
organized market because it requires real time operation from the system operator to 
balance the system. 
 
 
Since electricity consumption is difficult to predict and consumers can better 
estimate their consumption one day in advance than one year in advance the day ahead 
market allows participants to adjust their portfolio one day before delivery. When they 
are organized on marketplaces, day a head markets take the form of either power 
exchanges or power pool. Day-ahead markets contain four stages: 
 
a) Participants submit bids 
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b) The marketplace determined the market price by accepting and rejecting 
bids 
c) Transactions are settled 
d) The results are transferred to the system operator in order to ensure 
physical delivery 
 
 
The real-time market is used to price deviations in supply and demand from 
contract specifications. These deviations, intentional or unintentional, must be corrected 
by the system operator to ensure physical delivery. The real time market is used to price 
these deviations and to keep the system in balance; the system operator needs to be able 
to call in extra production at very short notice that is why the real time market must be 
centralized. Bilateral markets are too slow to handle very short term operations. 
Moreover beyond balancing the real time market provides two mains others ancillary 
services one, transmission security and two, efficient dispatch. 
 
 
Consequently, day-ahead marketplaces and real-time marketplaces serve 
different purposes and are complementary. They represent the two main kinds of 
organized marketplaces in electricity. Their functioning is quite different and they 
should not be confused. This thesis however is based on day-ahead marketplaces. 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Advantages and Disadvantages of Pool Market 
 
 
  The pool market model provides competitive environment for the electricity 
market players which satisfy the objective of restructuring the electricity supply 
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industry (ESI). Nevertheless, this model has both advantages and disadvantages [18-
19]. The general advantages in applying the pool market model are: 
 
a) Contract for differences to hedge the risks from volatile pool prices for 
the producers and customer 
b) Generation part of business benefits when the pool prices are high  and 
the  distribution part of business benefits when the pool prices are low 
 
 
 Meanwhile, there are several general disadvantages offers by the pool market model 
such as:- 
 
a) The pool prices based on bid and offer prices which can be volatile from 
time to time  
b) Requires balancing mechanism in order to avoid transmission congestion 
(with the consideration on generator that will ON/OFF), in term of 
reliability can match between supply and demand 
c) Cost management and administration on this model based on market 
difference such as system cost and current infrastructure 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
A BILATERAL BASED MARKET DESIGN FOR MESI 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
A pool market model can be said as a kick-starter in moving forward towards 
creating a competitive environment in the electricity supply industry. As explained 
previously in Chapter 4, the generators in this market model will compete with each 
other by submitting the least cost in order to sell their production, and this might help in 
reducing the tariff rate to the end-user. An extra tremendous competitive environment is 
created under bilateral market model as each transaction is a direct negotiation between 
the generators and distributors without the existence of third party as practiced in the 
pool market model. Therefore, several bilateral electricity market model which is 
designed based on MESI under the current environment is included in this chapter in 
order to compare with the previous models and produce a dependable results.  
 
  
 The bilateral market model attracts buyers and sellers to choose different forms 
of bilateral trading or contracts depending on the amount of time available and the 
quantity to be traded. This study focus on the economic aspect from the perspective of 
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the generators, the proposed model is being designed in order to overcome several 
disadvantages of the pure bilateral market models.   
 
 
 
 
5.2 Overview of Bilateral Market Model 
 
 
The bilateral is motivated by the concept that free market trading is the best way 
to achieve the competition in the electricity wholesale. This trading involves only two 
market participants; a buyer and a seller who makes the contracts. Usually the seller 
will be generators and buyers will be distributors companies and eligible consumers. 
The buyer takes full responsibility for acquiring all of the electricity required for their 
enterprise at the best prices that can be negotiated; seller have full responsibility for 
selling as much of their available energy as they can at the best prices that they can 
achieve. Participants enter into contracts without involvement, interference or 
facilitation from a third party. The electricity prices and transacted MW are decided by 
these participants not the system operator. Once the transactions are settled, the ISO 
need to be informed about the trade since ISO is responsible to ensure that the 
transactions do not endanger the system security as shown in Figure 5.1. 
  
Figure 5.1: Bilateral Market Structure 
 
ISO
Bilateral Contracts
Energy Supplier Customer 
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The bilateral market model allows their customer/buyer to directly deal with 
generation company (GenCo) in energy purchasing, basically no other party is involved, 
of course both party can have contract more than one another. Unlike single buyer 
model, the transmission company (TransCo) no longer deal with energy buying and 
selling, hence no capacity payment is involved. It acts as a transmission facilities 
provider, and focus on facilitating the power flow between GenCo and customers, 
where customers can be distribution company (DisCo). In this phase GenCo pays the 
transmission charges to TransCo, and DisCo or customer pays similar charges to 
TransCo to access the transmission facilities and services. 
 
 
Due to the fact that DisCo to be direct in negotiation with GenCo, it requires 
DisCo to search around and get the best deals from GenCo. This has prompted the 
growth of brokers and power exchanges, which can facilitate further competition. The 
bilateral contract can be very flexible, which can be either long or short term based on 
the price and delivery date that meet both parties’ requirements. 
 
 
The bilateral model contains an intermediate Power Exchange (PX) that 
balances the supply and demand since it is always unmatched. It creates an environment 
that both sellers and buyers can go to PX and compensate the contracts by purchasing or 
selling power in the exchanger. Under this model, economic dispatch is not applicable.  
Figure 5.2 shows the basic bilateral contract model. From this figure, it is clearly stated 
that GenCo are free to sell their output to any customer and pass through any TransCo 
by doing long term contracts. If it happen to be shortfall or over supply of power during 
the day as the load fluctuated, then the players will use the power exchange to balance 
out the supply and the demand.  
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Figure 5.2:   Basic Bilateral Contract Model 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Market Settlement Strategies 
 
 
Depending on the amount of time available and the quantity to be traded, buyers 
and sellers will resort to different forms of bilateral market model as stated below [8]; 
 
a) Customized long-term contracts 
b) Trading “over the counter” (OTC): 
c) Electronic trading 
 
 
 
 
GenCo 
Customer 
GenCo 
Customer 
TransCo Power Exchange 
(PX) 
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5.2.1.1 Customized long-term contracts 
 
 
The terms of such contracts are flexible since the buyer and the seller are 
negotiated privately to meet the needs and objectives of both parties. They usually 
involve the sale of large amounts of power (hundreds or thousands of MW) over long 
periods of time (several months to several years). The large transaction costs associated 
with the negotiation of such contracts make them worthwhile only when the parties 
want to buy or sell large amount of energy. 
 
 
5.2.1.2 Trading “over the counter” (OTC) 
 
 
This transaction involves smaller amounts of energy to be delivered according to 
a standard profile, that is, a standardized definitions of how much energy should be 
delivered during different periods of the day and week. This form of trading has much 
lower transaction costs and is used by producers and consumers to refine their position 
as delivery time approaches. The word refine means if the generators short of supply 
power, they can buy the electricity in the market (in this situation the generators become 
buyer) and if the consumers had bought extra power, they can sell the electricity in the 
market (in this situation consumers become seller)  
 
 
5.2.1.3 Electronic trading 
 
 
Participants can either offers to buy energy and bids to sell energy directly in a 
computerized marketplace. All market participants can observe the quantity and prices 
submitted but do not know the identity of the party that submitted each bid or offer. The 
software that runs the exchange will check to see if there is a matching offer for the 
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period of delivery of the bid each time a party enters a new bid. If it finds an offer 
whose price is greater than or equal to the price of the bid, a deal is automatically struck 
and the price and quantity are displayed  for all participants to see. If no match is found, 
the new bid is added to the list of outstanding bids and will remain there until a 
matching offer is made or the bid is withdrawn or it lapses because the market closes for 
that period. A similar procedure is used if a new offer is entered in the system. This 
form of trading is extremely fast and cheap. A flurry of trading activity often takes place 
in the minutes and seconds before the closing of the market as generators and retailers 
fine-tune their position ahead of the delivery period 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Characteristic of bilateral market model 
 
 
According to the market settlement strategy, the essential characteristic of 
bilateral trading can be listed as below:  
 
a) the price of each transaction is set independently by the parties involves, 
therefore, there is no “official” price 
b) The details of negotiated long term contracts are usually kept private, some 
independent reporting services usually gather information about over-the-
counter trading and publish summary information about the prices and quantities 
in a form that does not reveal the identity of the parties involved 
c) this type of market reporting and the display of the last transaction arranged 
through electronic trading enhance the efficiency of the market by giving all 
participants a clearer idea of the state and the directions of the market 
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5.2.3 Example on bilateral market model 
 
Malaysia Power trades in the Malaysian electricity market that operates on a 
bilateral basis. It owns the three generating units whose characteristics are given in the 
table below. To keep things simple, we have assumed that the marginal cost of these 
units is constant over their range of operation. Because of their large start-up cost, 
Malaysia Power tries to keep unit A synchronized to the system at all times and to 
produce as much as possible with unit B during the daytime. The start-up cost of unit C 
is assumed to be negligible. 
Unit Type Pmin Pmax MC 
(MW) (MW) (RM/MWh) 
A Large Coal 100 500 10 
B Medium Coal 50 200 13 
C Gas Turbine 0 50 17 
 
Let us focus on the contractual position of Malaysia Power for the period between 2.00 
and 3.00 PM. on 11 June. The table below summarizes the relevant bilateral contracts. 
 
Type Contract 
date 
Identifier Buyer Seller Amount Price 
(MWh) (RM/MWh)
Long Term 10 Jan LT1 Cheopo 
Energy 
Malaysia 
Power 
200 12.5 
Long Term 7 Feb LT2 Malaysia 
Steel 
Malaysia 
Power 
250 12.8 
Future  3 Marc FT1 Quality 
Electron 
Malaysia 
Power 
100 14.0 
Future  7 Apr FT2 Malaysia 
Power 
Perfect 
Power 
30 13.5 
Future  10 May FT3 Cheopo 
Energy 
Malaysia 
Power 
50 13.8 
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Note that Malaysia Power has taken advantage of the price fluctuations in the 
forward market to buy back at a profit some of the energy that it had sold. Toward 
midmorning on 11 June, Fiona, the trader on duty at Malaysia Power, must decide if she 
wants to adjust this position by trading on the screen-based Malaysian Power Exchange 
(MPeX). On the one hand, Malaysia Power has contracted to deliver 570 MWh and has 
a total production capacity of 750 MW available during that hour. On the other hand, 
her MPeX trading screen displays the following stacks of bids and offers: 
 
 
 
 Based on her experience with this market, Fiona believes that it is unlikely that 
the offer prices will increase. Since she still has 130MW of spare capacity on unit B, 
she decides to grab offers 01, 02 and 03 before one of her competitors does. These 
offers are indeed profitable because their price is higher than the marginal cost of unit 
B. After completing these transactions, Fiona sends revised production instructions for 
11 June 
2.00 pm to 3.00 
pm 
Identifier Amount Price 
(MWh) (RM/MWh) 
Bids to sell energy B5 20 17.50 
B4 25 16.30 
B3 20 14.40 
B2 10 13.90 
B1 25 13.70 
Offers to buy 
energy 
01 20 13.50 
02 30 13.30 
03 10 13.25 
04 30 12.80 
05 50 12.55 
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this hour to the power plants. Unit A is to generate at rated power (500MW), while unit 
B is to set its output at 130MW and unit C is to remain on standby. 
 Shortly before the MPeX closes trading for the period between 2.00 pm and 3.00 
pm, Fiona receives a phone call from the operator of plant B. He informs her that the 
plant has developed some unexpected mechanical problems. It will be able to remain 
on-line until the evening but will not be able to produce more than 80 MW. Fiona 
quickly realizes that this failure leaves Malaysia Power exposed and that she has three 
options: 
 
a) Do nothing, leaving Malaysia Power short by 50 MWh that would have to be 
paid for at the spot market price 
b) Make up this deficit by starting up unit C 
c) Try to buy some replacement power on the MPeX. 
 
 Since the spot market prices have been rather erratic lately, Fiona is not very 
keen on remaining unbalanced. She therefore decides to see if she can buy energy on 
the MPeX for less than the marginal cost of unit C. Since she last traded on the MPeX, 
some bids have disappeared and new ones have been entered. 
 
 
11 June 
2.00 pm to 3.00 pm 
Identifier Amount Price 
(MWh) (RM/MWh) 
Bids to sell energy B5 20 17.50 
B4 25 16.30 
B3 20 14.40 
B6 20 14.30 
B8 10 14.10 
Offers to buy 
energy 
04 30 12.80 
06 25 12.70 
05 50 12.55 
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Fiona immediately selects bids B8. B6 and B3 because they allow her to restore 
the contractual balance of the company for this trading period at a cost that is less than 
the cost of covering the deficit with unit C. On balance, when trading closes for this 
hour, Malaysia Power is committed to produce 580 MWh. Note that Fiona based all her 
decision on the incremental cost of producing energy.  
 
 
Bilateral market introduces screen based trading, in the short term and balancing 
markets, to promote real-time price transparency and encourage independent price 
reporting as in other commodity futures markets. This has been beneficial for the 
participants. This model with bilateral contracts and a voluntary power exchange has 
been implemented in several European countries, with exchanges in the Netherlands 
(Amsterdam Power eXchange), France (Powernext), the Scandinavian countries 
(NordPool), Germany (EEX), Poland (PolPX) and Austria (EXAA). One can have 
several competing exchanges in one country, as was the case in Germany (EEX and 
LPX) and England (UKPX, APX, PowerEX and IPE). 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Bilateral market model design for MESI 
 
 
Bilateral market model is an open trading which incurs very high cost if MESI 
plan to apply the model. A lot of changes have to be done, especially on the structure. 
Current structure only allows private sectors in generation level, but with bilateral 
market model, we can see that TNB will not be able to monopolise the transmission and 
distribution sector as currently. There will be more distribution and transmission 
companies that can provide the services and the players are free to choose their own 
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choice. However, this situation may occur in 50 years time in MESI, therefore a few 
bilateral market model design based on MESI under current environment is covered in 
this section.  
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Bilateral Market Model No.1 
 
 
Few assumptions are made in order to make the design of the bilateral model 
become easier.  The trading process is exactly the same as pool market model which is 
via bidding process but in this case they submit their bid price to the distributor 
company which is TNBD. All generators will try to submit the energy price rate as low 
as possible so that they manage to sell the output through the contract signed with the 
TNBD. There is no price scheme as exercise in pool market model, but generators will 
be paid based on their agreed price signed previously. Below are the details of the 
assumptions that are made and the model is represented as in Figure 5.3: 
 
a) Only one distribution company is involved, assumed to be TNBD 
b) All generators have to submit their energy bid price to TNBD 
c) The dispatch selection is purely dependent on the agreement signed 
between distribution company and generators which are based on merit 
order list and the current load demand 
d) The agreement also is based on the bid price submitted by generators 
e) Exclude the capacity payment 
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Figure 5.3: Bilateral Model No. 1 
 
 
This model creates a real competitive market as each generator is competing for 
surviving due to the negligence of the capacity payment. Generators with higher energy 
bid price may face problem in selling their power all the time except during the load 
when it is at the peak. On the other hand, the distributor company is boundless to select 
the lowest energy bid price for energy trading. Without transmission losses being taken 
into account, it is assumed can effectively bring down energy tariff which is beneficial 
to the end users. 
  
 
 
 
5.3.2 Bilateral Market Model No.2 
 
 
In order to minimise the transmission losses, the distance between a generator 
and a distribution company shall be taken into account. In view of this, the distance 
between seller and buyer is a key factor that influences the energy price. Each generator 
is classified in regions depending on their location, where the load must be fulfilled by 
the generator in the same region. However, the demand may exceed the supply in some 
Gen 1 Gen n+1 
DisCo 
........... 
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region as the load consumption is based on the activities done in that region. For 
example, more power needed for industrial area compare to rural area. Therefore, if the 
region is short of energy, the distribution company has to purchase from adjacent region 
generator companies. The assumptions are summary as follows: 
 
a) Classified the generators in four regions, namely centre, southern, northern and 
eastern region. On the other hand, only one distribution company assigned to be 
in each region and total up to four distribution companies. 
 
b) Load must be fulfilled by the generators in the same region. The distribution 
company is only allowed to purchase from adjacent region, if there is any 
particular case that shortfall within the region as it helps to reduce the 
transmission losses. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the generators and distribution companies classified in 
different regions, where they are free to negotiate among themselves but limited to be in 
the same region.  They can only approach the other regions if the requirement cannot be 
fulfilled within the same region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4:   IPPs and DisCos differentiated in regions 
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Transmission charges can be minimized by applying this market model. The 
generators are obliged to sell their power to the local region’s distribution company 
only except when there is surplus demand. Same issue as previous model, some of the 
generators with higher energy bid price in the region may face problem in selling their 
energy as cheaper generators will win the battle first. The other point to be noted is that 
the distribution company is limited to purchase power from local region’s generators 
prior to adjacent regions. This may results higher energy bid price and as distribution 
company had no choice but to accept. Meanwhile, the distribution company in the 
regions that have energy shortage problem might have to purchase energy with higher 
bid price from other region which may increase the energy tariff to the end users. 
Therefore, it is suggested to set out more power plants in the energy shortages region. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Bilateral Market Model No.3 
 
 
Similar to pool market model, there are several generators especially with the 
higher bid price that are found hard to survive. These generators only get an income 
during peak load; therefore the same concept of hybrid model as discussed in Chapter 4 
is being suggested to overcome this issue. In this case study, the base load demand is 
being shared fairly within GenCos, and the other conditions are assumed to be the same 
as bilateral market model no.2. The assumptions made for this case study are 
summarised as below: 
 
a) The concept of model no. 2 remains the same as in this model 
b) Assumed that the bid price submitted by the IPPs is maintained 
c) The portion of supply for the base load is by using the pro-rate concept 
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The generators will have a guaranteed minimum income as each of them has the 
opportunity to supply the base load regardless of their energy bid price. The remaining 
load demand is being traded through bidding process in their own regions. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.4 Proposed bilateral market model for MESI 
 
 
From the bilateral market model no.1, it was shown clearly that a significant 
amount of energy tariff is reduced however it is not practical since transmission losses 
are not taken into account. The bilateral market model no.2 take into account the 
transmission losses, and create a regional competition among generators in the market, 
however some of the generators may face the consequence of being closed down due to 
the higher energy bid price. Lastly, the bilateral market model no.3 may be able to help 
the generators by ensuring their survival in the competitive market.  
 
 
Since the objective of restructuring is to propose a competitive market, bilateral 
market model no.3 is not recommended. To create a competitive market, bilateral 
market model no.1 and no.2 are possible to do so. However, the structure of bilateral 
market model no.1 is the nearest ones to the MESI existing structure compare to other 
models. Therefore, this model is being proposed to be applied in MESI. Details 
comparison and analysis of the proposed model and the existing ones can be observed 
in the next chapter. 
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5.4 Economic Aspect of Bilateral Market Model 
 
 
In bilateral market model, there are two main sides of market participants who 
make the contracts namely generators and customers.  The generators and customers 
can directly negotiate in the market place with their own selected entities without 
requiring to enter into pooling arrangement. It is believed that, bilateral implementation 
cost is cheaper and will benefit small generators since the deal is not based on ISO. In 
fact, domination is lesser in bilateral model which make it the best in modern electricity 
market. The mathematical equation of this model for generation income and demand 
charges can be written as per details: 
 
 
For total generation income, GT the formula is: 
 
 
 ∑
=
×=
k
i
GiGiT CPG
1
)(     (5.1) 
 GiGii CPG ×=      (5.2) 
Where,  
PGi =  Power capacity of ith generator; satisfy the demand 
CGi = Bid Price offered by ith generator 
k =  Numbers of generators involved 
GT = Total generation income in RM/h 
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5.4.1 Example of a Simple Case Study 
 
  
The same example and data in the previous simple case study in Section 3.3.4 
and Section 4.5.1 are being used in order to give an overview of the proposed bilateral 
market model for MESI. Similarly as practiced in the pool market model, the business is 
based on the competition among generators. Generators will submit their energy bid 
price and only the least bid price generators are able to sell their output. This situation 
can create competition among generators as each of them try to be the least bid price 
generators. Same assumption as written in Section 4.5.1, as the energy bid price will 
include the capacity price in hourly basis. The numbers of succeeded generators that 
supply the load remains the same as previous chapter. Detail calculation for the 
proposed bilateral market model in this example can be referred to the APPENDIX D. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the revenue obtained by each generator in this bilateral 
market model. It can be observed G4 is unable to get any income at all for both low and 
medium demand. Meanwhile, the G3 manage to obtain an income for each types of load 
except for the low demand. This means that by applying bilateral market model which 
is based only on the energy price, the expensive generators will be unable to obtain 
revenues at low demand and only manage to get income during high demand.  
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Figure 5.5: Each generation’s revenues at different demand  
 
 
5.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of Bilateral Market Model 
 
 
Below are the listed advantages of the bilateral market model: 
 
a) The ability of the government to intervene in the payment chain from consumers 
to generators is diminished 
b) The government don’t have the authority to decide about the new construction 
of power plant because it is based on private investor’s decisions 
c) Improve payment collection as the generators are been given the opportunities to 
choose their own reliable buyers. 
d) The decisions on new capacity will be based on market  
e) Better opportunities for cross border electricity trade 
f) Market participants benefits more price transparency, no counter price risk with 
anonymous trading 
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On the other hand, the bilateral market model also occupies own disadvantages 
as listed follows: 
 
a) The electricity production and consumption of sellers and buyers seldom match 
the contracted amounts. Hence, need balancing mechanisms which make trading 
becomes complicated.  
b) Requires development of transmission access and pricing regime that reflects 
capacity constraints and loss factors in the high-voltage network. 
c) Lead to suboptimal dispatch schedules 
d) The lack of unified wholesale market price, such that the electricity price for 
small consumers depends on the power purchase contracts signed by their 
distributors 
e) All bids and offer are firm such that the generator must deliver, and a consumer 
take delivery according to the contract which is very risky but the participants 
have the opportunity to trade in OTC 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
A case study is presented in this chapter which is purposely conducted in order 
to compare the generators revenue in Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry (MESI) 
under three selected market models, as follows; (i) Single Buyer Model, (ii) Pool 
Market Model with Uniform Price Scheme, (iii) Bilateral Market Model No. 1. The two 
new market models were chosen as the current structure of MESI is able to apply these 
models without major changes that can incur a large cost. With the intention to identify 
the effect of applying new market model in MESI towards the generators including 
TNBGs and IPPs, both existing and the two new market model will be analyzed by 
using the actual load profile in peninsular Malaysia. Several assumptions are made in 
order to reduce the complexity of the study.  
 
 
This chapter begins with the comparison of the three selected market model 
based on the example of a simple case study which have been discussed in Chapter 3, 
  
112
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 previously. It is intended to recap these models’s characteristic 
as preceding comparisons are between the same types of market models. Next section 
will describe on the process of designing the market models by using MATLAB 
Simulation.   
 
 
 
 
6.2 Comparison on the Selected Market Models 
 
 
The comparison between the selected market models is based on the example of 
a simple case study discussed in Section 3.3.4, Section 4.5.1 and Section 5.4.1. This 
simple case study present four generators G1, G2, G3 and G4 that have to supply three 
types of load; i.e. 1500 MW (low demand), 4000 MW (medium demand) and 5000 MW 
(high demand). G1 until G4 is being stacked into merit order list where the energy bid 
price for G1 is the lowest among others and G4 is the most expensive.  
 
 
In this simple case study only single buyer model consider the capacity payment 
besides energy payment as practiced currently in MESI. This means that each generator 
will receive a minimum income without considering the quantity of power sold. They 
will get additional energy payment if they manage to sell their power. Meanwhile, the 
pool and bilateral market model only consider the energy payment. Therefore, the 
generators will only obtain an income if they succeed to sell their power. Pool and 
bilateral market models encourage generators to compete in selling their power by 
submitting the least cost. This is because the power will be sold based on merit order, 
whereby, the lowest offer price generators will sell their power first, compare to the 
higher energy bid price. As a result, the generators with higher bid price will only make 
incomes during high demand.  
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In reality, the rate for energy bid price should reflects all cost and it will be 
much higher as compared to the energy price rate stated in the single buyer model. 
Considering this issue, the new energy bid price is being calculated which consist of the 
capacity price in hourly basis. The new energy bid price is used in the pool and bilateral 
market model. Basically, the concept of power selling for this three selected model is 
the same. All markets model were based on the merit order list and power selling 
depends on the current demand needed. The main difference is the price in single buyer 
model is being fixed as they are obliged to the PPA. But the price in pool market model 
may be volatile from time to time as it depends on the current market. On the other 
hand, the energy price for bilateral market model is based on the agreement made by the 
distributor and the generator company. In term of the flexibility of customer or the 
distributor, they are flexible if they enter the bilateral market model, compare to single 
buyer and pool market model.   
 
 
In spite of this, each market model award different effects to the market players. 
But in this simple case study, the main intention is to observe the effect of applying 
these market models towards the generation revenue. This observation should reflect the 
electricity tariff endured by the end users. Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3 
illustrate the outcome due to the application the three market model during low, 
medium and high demand. Meanwhile, the total generation revenue for all types of 
demand is describes in Figure 6.4. Details calculation can be referred as in APPENDIX 
E. 
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6.4 Load Demand Curve for Peninsular Malaysia 
 
 
The hourly load demand curve for peninsular Malaysia is used in the case study 
as the load is heavier than load consumed in Sabah and Sarawak. Basically, there are 
four different types of load profile recorded and it differ with respect to time such as 
weekday load, Saturday load, Sunday Load and public holiday load. The load profile 
curve is shown in Figure 6.5 [20]. The details number for load profile for each hour in 
the four types of profile can be referred in APPENDIX F. 
 
 
It is important to know the location of load demand, however this load 
profile curve does not illustrate the location of the load demand. This is because, in 
economic dispatch, there are two main factors that should be considered such as: 
 
a) The marginal cost of production 
b) The transmission losses 
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Therefore, without the information on the location of demand, the transmission 
losses could not be considered in the study. For example, if the highest load demand 
intensity i.e. Klang Valley, is being supplied by the nearest location of power plant, 
the effect of transmission line losses can be reduced. On the contrary, if the nearest 
generators could not supply, the cost of transmitting electrical energy will be higher 
due to losses. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: The peninsular load profile curves 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Design Properties 
 
  
 The participants involved in this design model are limited to the 14 Independent 
Power Producers (IPP) which are bonded with power purchase agreement (PPA). This 
is because the fourteen IPPs are sufficient enough to supply the load consumed by the 
peninsular of Malaysia. There are many other power plants from TNBG side, but in this 
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case study, they were neglected. This is because as proposed in the market policies, the 
hydro power plant will not involved in the bidding process. Meanwhile, other power 
plants owned by TNBG are neglected as the machine is not so efficient and thus the 
energy bid price might not reflect the actual values. Compare to IPP power plant which 
are not only new and apply the latest technology but also high in efficiency. The details 
of the IPPs that involved in this case study are simplified in Table 6.1. As mentioned 
previously, the private power producers will compete in pool and bilateral market 
model that used the current load profile as the base demand needed. Same concept 
applied to the existing model, whereby only the private power producers will supply the 
electrical energy.  
 
The case study is applied on actual load profile of Peninsular Malaysia which is 
provided by the TNB. There are four type of load profile; Weekdays, Saturday, Sunday 
and Public Holiday Load Profile. These load profile is assumed to be fixed at the 
particular of hour for the whole year. Even though, the demand always fluctuated each 
day but the load profile illustrates the proximity to actual data. 
 
 
In the single buyer model, the IPPs will receive two payments, which is capacity 
payment and energy payment. The capacity payment is being paid as long as the IPPs 
remain available to supply the energy and it is regardless the amount of energy 
transferred to the grid system. As for the energy payment, which values differ from one 
IPP to the other is being paid if only they able to sell their energy to the power agency 
(in this case is TNB). It is assumed that the generations are based on economic dispatch. 
i.e. the IPP with the least energy payment will be the first to generate followed by the 
IPP with the next least energy payment and so on until all load demands of that hour are 
met.  
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The one sided pool or single auction power pool is used in the market design as 
it is the nearest market model that suitable with MESI current structure. TNB will act as 
the pool operator meanwhile the market participants will be the power producers and 
TNBD. This kind of auction provides competition among generation side in supplying 
the electrical energy to fulfill the demand required. The bid price and capacity available 
for the IPPs are being stacked from the least price up to the highest to form a supply 
curve. The intersection between the supply curve and load curve during specific hour 
determines the system marginal price (SMP). This price is used as the energy rate for all 
energy transaction as only uniform price scheme is available in this case study. The 
trading is handled in hourly basis and the bid price is assumed to be fixed at each 
trading hour. 
 
 
Bilateral market model possess three market strategies that depends on the 
amount of time available and the quantities to be traded. In order to simplify this model, 
it is assumed that distributor company, TNBD had signed the contract with IPPs based 
on merit order list and the current demand. In reality, there is no such thing as demand 
always match the supply, therefore power exchange is being used to balance out the 
deviation. However, this case assumed that all demand and supply is perfectly balance 
and match. IPPs are being paid based on their agreement signed with TNBD and the 
energy price rate depends on both side bargain made previously.  
 
 
The design model in the case study is based on confidential data which could not 
be included in this thesis. The data consists of installed, capacity price and the energy 
bid price for each generator. Single buyer model used the same capacity and the energy 
price for each hour throughout the four types of load profile. But for both pool and 
bilateral market model, they used a rate of energy bid price that already considered the 
capacity price in hourly basis. The energy bid price in the pool and bilateral market 
model is assumed to be the same all the time. In actual situation, the rate might be 
differed from one another and the power producers might change their energy bid price 
  
121
depending on current market i.e. the fuel price or the forecast demand. Therefore, this 
case study may not produce a result with 100% accuracy, but as a preliminary 
observation, it is still acceptable. 
 
All market models considered in this case study are the most simple concept as 
the main purpose of this chapter is to produce a result that describes the effect towards 
the generators in term of the revenue when MESI starts to apply new competitive 
market model. If MESI is seriously confirm in applying the new competitive market 
model, the hybrid model discussed previously may be used in next research study as the 
market model provide a win-win situation to all market players. However, the hybrid 
model is not considered in this case study. 
 
Table 6.1: Lists of IPPs in Malaysia with their installed capacity and type of plant; 
Combine Circle Gas Turbine (CCGT), Open Cycle (OC) and Thermal (Coal) 
No Private Power Plant Ins. Cap. (MW) Type of Plant 
1 Panglima Power Sdn. Bhd. 720.0 CCGT 
2 Pahlawan Power Sdn. Bhd. 322.0 CCGT 
3 GB3 Sdn. Bhd. 640.0 CCGT 
4 Teknologi Tenaga Perlis Consortium 
Sdn. Bhd. 
650.0 CCGT 
5 Prai Power. Sdn. Bhd. 350.0 CCGT 
6 Genting Sanyen Power Sdn. Bhd. 740.0 CCGT 
7 Kapar Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. 2,420.0 OC, Thermal 
8 Port Dickson Power Sdn. Bhd. 436.4 OC 
9 Powertek Berhad 434.0 OC 
10 YTL Power Generation Sdn Bhd 1,170.0 CCGT 
11 TNB Janamanjung Sdn. Bhd. 2,070.0 Thermal 
12 Segari Energy Ventures Sdn. Bhd. 1,400.0 CCGT 
13 Jimah Energ Ventures Sdn. Bhd. 1,303.0 Thermal 
14 Tanjung Bin Power Sdn. Bhd. 2,100.0 Thermal 
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With regard to the economic dispatch, this case study will only consider one 
factor which is the marginal cost of production. This means that the least energy bid 
price is able to sell their output first compared to the expensive generators. A healthy 
competitive environment can be developed as each power producers will not only try to 
submit the least bid price, but the bid price must be able to overcome their cost of 
production. Furthermore, all cases in this project will be unconstrained cases, whereby 
all power producers manage to transmit their electrical energy accordingly without 
facing transmission congestion problem.  
 
 
Finally, the loss of load probability (LOLP) that is used in calculating the pool 
purchase price, CPP is assumed to be zero. Therefore, the generation incomes for power 
producers reflect the demand charges set by customers. However, in the actual situation, 
usually the value of LOLP is never zero, but as the purpose of the project is only for 
introduction, the consideration is acceptable. As the LOLP become zero, the effect of 
value of loss load (VOLL) also is neglected whereas the value of VOLL for Malaysia is 
known as 1/365. 
 
 
  
 
6.6 MATLAB Simulation [21] 
 
 
All three market models are being designed in the MATLAB software in order 
to simplify the process of the analysis. The design starts with the flowchart for each 
market model. From the flowchart, a programming using C language is written in M-
file to describe the flow that the MATLAB has to pass through, as shown in Figure 6.6.  
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Figure 6.6: The M-file in the MATLAB Software 
 
 
After the programming is completed, the file will be runned and at the command 
window, user has to select a load profile before the analysis is done; the selection is 
between weekday, Saturday, Sunday and public holiday load profile. Figure 6.7 
describes the situation.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Enter Load Profile at the command window 
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Several results regarding the graph also are included in the programming, so that 
it is easier to compare the benefits between each market models. These can be seen in 
the Chapter 7. As a precaution, the answers are being verified by using Microsoft Office 
Excel. The data from the MATLAB simulation at hour 16 (4.00 p.m) is compared with 
the manual calculation in order to verify the answers as shown in Figure 6.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Verify the answer using Excel 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
 
MATLAB SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents the simulation results and analysis of the three market 
models in term of generation revenue. It provides generators scheduling details based 
on four types of load profile; i.e. weekday, Saturday, Sunday and public holiday. The 
total generation revenue for each market model is being compared weekly, monthly and 
annually in order to evaluate their economic aspects on the application of this model.  
 
 
 
 
7.2 Case Study 
 
 
For each type of market model, the same concept of stacked price is being used 
for each hour in each day as shown in Figure 7.1. The single buyer model used the 
stacked price in order to determine which generators succeed to obtain the energy 
payment besides capacity payment that is paid at a fixed amount every month upon their 
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availability of the supply. Meanwhile, pool market model construct the staked price 
based on the energy bid price submitted by the generators. Usually, generators will 
submit different energy bid price for each hour based on the current market, but in this 
case study, the same staked is being used for each hour. As for bilateral market model, 
the generators with the least energy bid price which is shown in the stacked price are 
those who managed to sign the bilateral contract with TNBD. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The stacked price 
 
Bear in mind that both pool and bilateral market model used new energy bid 
price which consider the capacity price on hourly basis. Even though the energy price 
rate may not be the same as the exact rate, but it is expected that the energy bid price 
rate maybe higher in competitive environment than in the existing model. Moreover, the 
energy price may fluctuate from time to time and this may results uncertainty of 
generators revenue. Therefore, it is possible to presume that the pool market model is 
more expensive compare to single buyer model.  
 
 
127 
 
 
The capacity price for each independent power producer is shown graphically in 
Figure 7.2. Note that, the Gen 7 (YTL Corporation Sdn. Bhd) does not incur any 
capacity price. This is due to the fact that YTL has guaranteed to supply 80% of their 
installed capacity to the grid system as for the encouragement of the pioneer generations 
of IPP. Therefore, the PPA only includes energy payment and neglected the capacity 
payment. Nevertheless, this case study requires YTL to enter the bidding process as 
well as other generators but with the capacity payment remains zero. It is expected that 
YTL will gain less revenue under the new competitive market model if they did not 
revise current PPA.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The capacity price for each IPP 
  
 
 
 
7.3 Results Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
The total generation revenues for each hour in a day and for each type of load 
profile; i.e. weekday, Saturday, Sunday, and public holidays are illustrated in Figure 
7.3, Figure 7.4, Figure 7.5, and Figure 7.6 respectively. From these four figures, it can 
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be observed that the total generation revenue for each hour is influenced by the current 
demand and the type of market model applied.  
 
 
The single buyer model illustrates that the generators gain less income which 
means that the cost required by the end users is still reasonable compare with the other 
two market model. However, this situation only valid during the weekday and Saturday 
load profile but not for public holiday and Sunday. At this moment of time, the single 
buyer model is the most expensive compare to the other two models. This shows that 
single buyer may not be applicable during low load.  
 
 
On the other hand, the generators are able to make maximum profits under the 
pool market model during peak load, (please refer to the generators revenue during 
weekday and Saturday load profile). This is due to the uniform price scheme used in 
this market model whereby, all generators that will be paid based on system marginal 
price regardless of their previous energy bid price. This system marginal rate is 
determined by intersection between the supply and demand. Therefore the rate will be 
high relatively when the current demand is high and at the point when the generators 
with least energy bid price will be able to maximize their profits. Market power exercise 
problem may result due to this as discussed in Chapter 4. Some policies controlled by 
the government may be suggested in order to overcome the problem.  
  
 
Bilateral market model can be said as good from the perspective of end users as  
the cost seems to be cheaper at all load profile. This is due to the fact that each 
generator that signed the bilateral contract will be paid based on their agreed bid price 
which referred to their bid energy price. From the generators side, they may find 
aversion in applying this market model as the revenue will be less. But in reality, it is 
difficult to ensure that the supply matches the demand all the time and there will be a lot 
of changes in the MESI structure upon the application of this market model.  
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As mentioned previously, the generation revenue is based on the applied market 
model and the current demand needed at that point of time. There were several 
generators that obtain multiple gain of revenue under new competitive market model 
compare to the existing market model and vice versa. This shows that there should be a 
list of policy that are able to control the market price and construct the shape of returns 
or profits between all market players so that it will be in a win-win situation. The main 
important thing is that the energy tariff borne by end users is reasonable.  
 
 Figure 7.3: The total generation revenue at each hour; i.e. weekday load profile 
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Figure 7.4: The total generation revenue at each hour; i.e. Saturday load profile 
 
 
 Figure 7.5: The total generation revenue at each hour; i.e. Sunday load profile 
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Figure 7.6: The total generation revenue at each hour; i.e. public holiday load profile 
 
 
Meanwhile Figure 7.7, Figure 7.8, Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10 illustrate the 
figure of each generator’s revenue under the three market models for each types of load 
profile. The detail numbers of generation revenue for each market participant for each 
type of load profile can be seen in APPENDIX G. On the other hand the detail numbers 
of generation revenue for each IPP for weekly, monthly and annually basis are also 
tabulated in the same appendix.  
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The generators will get different amount of revenue upon the application of new 
market model. New market model may provide a transparent competitive environment 
which is good to the market but it also cause a higher risk of uncertainty. This shows 
that it is very important to create an exact model that most suits with the MESI 
environment in order to reduce the percentage of expected risk, especially with regard 
to the energy price. 
 
 
It can be observed that, the existing model has promised an incomes to the 
generators as all of them will get at least the capacity payment. Therefore, this market 
model does not influence much by the current demand except for generators that 
succeed to sell the energy, they will get extra incomes. As a result, generators do not 
have to work hard for gaining any incomes as long as they declare available, they will 
be paid through capacity payment. Nevertheless, this has show a discrepancy from the 
main intention of introducing the IPPs, which is to introduce a competitive environment 
among the generators sector. 
  
 
Majority of the generators obtain extremely high revenue under the pool market 
model as they are being paid based on the system marginal price. Most of the time, the 
current demand touch the SMP of an average of RM 310.56 per MWh whereby the 
generators with cheaper energy price will get benefit from this. However, generators 
with the most expensive energy bid price will get less revenue especially during low 
peak hour as shown in Sunday and Public Holiday load profile. At this point of time, 
there are generators that are unable to get any revenue at all. This case can be observed 
as for Gen 6 that is able to obtain the highest generation revenue for all types of load 
profile upon the pool market model application. But as for Gen14, it does not gain any 
income under the same model during Sunday and public holiday. 
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The revenues under the bilateral market model do not differ much from the 
existing market model, except during low load. This may seem that bilateral is slightly 
like single buyer model with no capacity payment at all. But bear in mind that the 
structure of MESI have to be modified in order to provide all services needed under this 
model which has incur a very high of cost. 
 
 
 From the results, it can be seen that the pool and bilateral market model provide 
a fair trading as it is based on energy bid price only and totally neglected the capacity 
price. From the tables, it can be seen that the generation revenue for the two market 
model are sometimes less and higher compare to the existing model. TNB does not have 
to pay the capacity price anymore but have to be aware that the energy price would be 
extremely high. 
 
 
The graph in Figure 7.7 shows that all generators’ receive their revenues for 
each type of market model during weekday load profile; the models are single buyer, 
pool with uniform price, and bilateral market model. The Gen 6 and Gen10 are 
successful to supply the intermediate load demand and receive high revenue since they 
submitted medium bid price and moreover they have a huge installed capacity. The 
most expensive generator is Gen 14 receives the lowest revenue for pool market model 
as they depend on the peak load only. 
 
 
Meanwhile during at low load (Saturdays, Sundays and Public Holidays), Gen 
14 does not receives any revenue at all for pool market model. The tabulated table in 
Appendix G2, Appendix G3 and Appendix G4 in APPENDIX G show the zero number 
(in red). It can be observed that the expensive generators are unable to get any incomes 
at all during the low demand. Therefore, they only participate during peak load. But this 
is only valid for pool market model.  
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Payment scheme that is done through under bilateral market model which is paid 
as in the specified agreement is seem to be more economical compare to the uniform 
price scheme under pool market model. This is with the assumption that power 
producers will submit the same amount of energy bid price for both pool and bilateral 
market model. Nevertheless, in the real situation, for bilateral market model, the 
generators might not agree on a price that does not reflect to their marginal cost of 
production. They will try to estimate the system marginal price and submit their bid 
price around the prediction rate, so that they can earn more incomes. The uniform price 
on the other hand, might create market power exercise. For instance, a big generator 
company that has high installed capacity might conquer the pool market. Therefore, this 
will increase the market risk and distort the stability of market. The market demand 
curve, the auction mechanism and their interaction all have great influences on the 
market prices and the influence of market demand is more significant. 
 
 
The economic benefits from the pool trading model and hybrid model are 
proven in this section. Table 7.1 illustrates the total generation income for all private 
power producers for each market model. 
 
 
Table 7.1: The total generation revenue for each market model 
 Single Buyer Pool Market  Bilateral Market 
Weekday 76,457,064.00 86,080,665.16 71,167,526.92 
Week 521,831,478.00 577,440,428.85 482,575,967.25 
Month 2,087,325,912.00 2,309,761,715.00 1,930,303,869.00 
Annual 25,047,910,944.00 27,717,140,585.00 23,163,646,428.00 
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It can be seen that by changing the existing market model to the pool market 
model, TNB have to pay more, up to RM 10 million per week. This is due to the 
uniform price scheme used in the case study. With the application of some policy, this 
additional amount could be reduced and thus help TNB. Under the bilateral market 
model, TNB can save up to RM 5 million per week. However, the cost to prepare the 
application of this market model is very costly. Even though it requires less or more 
payment but these new market models has introduced a competitive environment in the 
generators level. The monthly revenue of some IPP, on the other hand will be reduced 
due to these changes. The reduction indicates the amount that TNB can save. Moreover, 
customers may be paying less for the electrical energy compare to the existing model. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The ongoing restructuring in electricity supply has led to the introduction of 
several market models in the industry. These include the single buyer model, pool 
market model, bilateral and multilateral market model. Malaysia has been under 
restructuring process and successfully unbundled the generation as well as distribution 
from transmission and it ceased the monopoly status of TNB in this field. IPPs were 
introduced to provide competition in the field of generation, however, the terms under 
which these IPPs did not reflect real competition in generation. In current Single Buyer 
Model, IPPs are making huge money due to capacity payment obliged by TNB, which 
ensure that the capital costs are covered. Therefore, this study outlines the outcome of 
the analysis on several electricity market models that has been done. 
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This study presented three out of the four market model that have been observed 
and analyzed namely the existing market model, pool and bilateral market model. The 
single buyer model in the case study found flawed, and uncompetitive. The current 
structure of power generation is not sustainable in the long run if we need to keep our 
electricity tariff at fairly competitive levels. Hence, with this proposed model, it provide 
as a vehicle for IPPs to put an effort to renegotiate the 21 years PPAs. 
 
 
As it is today, we find that electricity tariff have gone up so much for the end-
users. TNB is hit by higher fuel cost while the government is bearing the burden of 
rising cost due to the subsidies but the IPPs are not sharing any of these burdens.  
 
 
Under the single buyer model, the generators had gained the largest revenue due 
to the existence of both capacity and energy payment. These generators still can obtain 
revenue even without any contribution to supply the load demand. This market does not 
provide any competition due to the long-term agreement; that simplify the electricity 
trading under one company which is TNB Transmission and Distribution. 
 
 
The pool market model on the other hand, offers full competitive model and 
based on uniform price scheme. This model fully removed the capacity payment and 
therefore reduces the revenue some of the generators quite significantly. The most 
expensive generators might not be able to get any revenue at all and hence will force 
each of them to bid for the cheapest energy price most of the time and this will create 
competition. However, this pricing scheme has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
The application of any scheme should be monitored strictly to control the market price. 
  
 
Both pool and bilateral market model are able to provide competition among 
IPPs. Bilateral model has also been proved that the ability of reducing energy tariff as 
shown in the case studied. However, these new market models can incur higher cost 
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sometimes especially during high peak for example, pool market model. Therefore, it 
has to be regulated by Energy Commission (EC) to avoid the existence of market power 
exercise besides controlling the energy price submitted by the IPPs.  
 
 
As a result, the generators will get reasonable profit, distributor company pay 
appropriate amount and end-consumers enjoyed low electricity tariff. Therefore, it is 
absolutely possible for MESI to apply the pool trading model as long as all market 
participants give full commitment and cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
8.2 Future Works 
 
 
For further future works, recommendations suggested for further investigations 
are on these following issues: 
 
a) Include TNBG data in the analysis 
 
In this case study, only fourteen IPPs are included in the case study and this does 
not reflect the actual situation in MESI. Therefore, with the TNBG data included 
in the analysis, the results reflect the actual situation. 
 
b) Constrained case 
 
In this case study, the transmission lines are violated to certain limits to cater for 
any (n-1) contingency. Thus generators must be redispatched so that these line 
contingency limits are not exceeded. 
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c) Bidding strategies 
 
Bidding strategies are usually applied by the generators in order to maximize 
their profits. The information of these may help the TNBG to maximize their 
revenue 
 
d) Market Power 
 
There is possibility in having the market power exercise in this pool market 
model. There are many kind of market power exercise that are possible to occur.  
By knowing their tricks, the regulator can control the exercise. 
 
e) Double auction in the pool market model 
 
By doing further studies on possibility of applying the double auction power on 
MESI, we will be exposed more on the wholesale market model which is more 
competitive. 
 
f) Consider a power exchange (PX) in bilateral market model 
 
In a real bilateral trading market, besides GenCos submit a bid, DisCos are also 
required to submit an offer to buy energy from GenCos, it therefore forms an 
auction market. Due to the supply and demand are always unmatched, in other 
words, the system imbalance, an intermediate so called power exchanger (PX) is 
needed to set out an open market to balance the supply and demand second by 
second, further to develop a balancing mechanism. Therefore, it is suggested 
that a case study that consider the PX is done so that the analysis will be more 
accurate compare to the real ones. 
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g) Balancing mechanism 
It is suggested also that further study is done in order to develop a balancing 
mechanism to solve the problems of imbalance and unmatched. 
 
 
Above recommendations are relate with the application of pool market model, 
whereas to apply the pool market model in MESI will require major system to monitor 
the flow of power which are costly. As an alternative, capacity payment terms have to 
be studied so that the renegotiation on the capacity payment can be made. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Appendix A: Detail Data on example of single buyer model 
 
 
Appendix A1: Generation Revenue at demand 1500 MW 
Appendix A2: Generation Revenue at demand 4000 MW 
Appendix A3: Generation Revenue at demand 5000 MW 
Appendix A4: Total Generation Revenue for all types of demand 
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Appendix A1: Generation Revenue at demand 1500 MW 
Gen. 
Energy Payment 
(RM) 
Capacity Payment 
(RM) 
Total 
Payment (RM) 
G1 78,000 32,500 110,500 
G2 119,000 103,500 222,500 
G3 0 105,000 105,000 
G4 0 22,000 22,000 
 
 
Appendix A2: Generation Revenue at demand 4000 MW 
Gen. 
Energy Payment 
(RM) 
Capacity Payment 
(RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 78,000 32,500 110,500 
G2 289,800 103,500 393,300 
G3 204,800 105,000 309,800 
G4 0 22,000 22,000 
 
 
Appendix A3: Generation Revenue at demand 5000 MW 
Gen. 
Energy Payment 
(RM) 
Capacity Payment 
(RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 78,000 32,500 110,500 
G2 289,800 103,500 393,300 
G3 336,000 105,000 441,000 
G4 32,400 22,000 54,400 
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Appendix A4: Total Generation Revenue for all types of demand 
Gen. 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 1500 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 4000 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 5000 
Total Gen. 
revenue (RM) 
G1 110,500 110,500 110,500 331,500 
G2 222,500 393,300 393,300 1,009,100 
G3 105,000 309,800 441,000 855,800 
G4 22,000 22,000 54,400 98,400 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Appendix B: Detail Data on example of pool market model with uniform price 
and pay as bid scheme 
 
Appendix B1: At demand 1500 MW (Uniform Price) 
Appendix B2: At demand 4000 MW (Uniform Price) 
Appendix B3: At demand 5000 MW (Uniform Price) 
Appendix B4: At demand 1500 MW (Pay as Bid) 
Appendix B5: At demand 4000 MW (Pay as Bid) 
Appendix B6: At demand 5000 MW (Pay as Bid) 
 Appendix B8: Total Generation Revenue for all types of demand (PAB) 
 Appendix B8: Total Generation Revenue for all types of demand (PAB) 
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Appendix B1: At demand 1500 MW (Uniform Price) 
Generator SMP Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 123,500 123,500 
G2 161,500 161,500 
G3 0 0 
G4 0 0 
 
 
Appendix B2: At demand 4000 MW (Uniform Price) 
Generator SMP Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 136,500 136,500 
G2 434,700 434,700 
G3 268,800 268,800 
G4 0 0 
 
 
Appendix B3: At demand 5000 MW (Uniform Price) 
Generator SMP Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 149,500 149,500 
G2 476,100 476,100 
G3 483,000 483,000 
G4 41,400 41,400 
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Appendix B4: At demand 1500 MW (Pay as Bid) 
Generator Energy Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM)
G1 110,500 110,500 
G2 161,500 161,500 
G3 0 0 
G4 0 0 
 
 
Appendix B5: At demand 4000 MW (Pay as Bid) 
Generator Energy Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 110,500 110,500 
G2 393,300 393,300 
G3 268,800 268,800 
G4 0 0 
 
 
Appendix B6: At demand 5000 MW (Pay as Bid) 
Generator Energy Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 110,500 110,500 
G2 393,300 393,300 
G3 441,000 441,000 
G4 41,400 41,400 
 
 
 Appendix B7: Total Generation Revenue for all types of demand (UP) 
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Gen. 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 1500 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 4000 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 5000 
Total Gen. 
revenue (RM) 
G1 123,500 136,500 149,500 409,500 
G2 161,500 434,700 476,100 1,072,300 
G3 0 268,800 483,000 751,800 
G4 0 0 41,400 41,400 
 
 
 Appendix B8: Total Generation Revenue for all types of demand (PAB) 
Gen. 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 1500 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 4000 
Gen revenue (RM) 
Demand at 5000 
Total Gen. 
revenue (RM) 
G1 110,500 110,500 110,500 331,500 
G2 161,500 393,300 393,300 948,100 
G3 0 268,800 441,000 709,800 
G4 0 0 41,400 41,400 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Appendix C: Detail Data on example of hybrid market model with uniform price and 
pay as bid scheme 
 
Appendix C1: At demand of 1500 MW (Hybrid and Uniform Price) 
Appendix C2: At demand of 4000 MW (Hybrid and Uniform Price) 
Appendix C3: At demand of 5000 MW (Hybrid and Uniform Price) 
Appendix C4: At demand of 1500 MW (Hybrid and Pay as Bid) 
Appendix C5: At demand of 4000 MW (Hybrid and Pay as Bid) 
Appendix C6: At demand of 5000 MW (Hybrid and Pay as Bid) 
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Appendix C1: At demand of 1500 MW (Hybrid and Uniform Price) 
Generator 
Base Payment 
(RM) 
SMP Payment 
(RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 21,007.60 85,000 106,007.60 
G2 74,771.86 0 74,771.86 
G3 83,840.60 0 83,840.60 
G4 19,239.54 0 19,239.54 
 
Appendix C2: At demand of 4000 MW (Hybrid and Uniform Price) 
Generator 
Base Payment 
(RM) 
SMP Payment 
(RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 21,007.60 110,549.43 131,557.03 
G2 74,771.86 352,057.41 426,829.28 
G3 83,840.60 167,393.16 251,233.46 
G4 19,239.54 0 19,239.54 
 
Appendix C3: At demand of 5000 MW (Hybrid and Uniform Price) 
Generator 
Base Payment 
(RM) 
SMP Payment 
(RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 21,007.60 121,077.95 142,085.55 
G2 74,771.86 383,586.69 460,358.56 
G3 83,840.60 391,174.90 475,015.21 
G4 19,239.54 22,160.46 41,400.00 
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Appendix C4: At demand of 1500 MW (Hybrid and Pay as Bid) 
Generator 
Base Payment 
(RM) 
Pay as Bid 
Payment (RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 21,007.60 85,000 106,007.60 
G2 74,771.86 0 74,771.86 
G3 83,840.60 0 83,840.60 
G4 19,239.54 0 19,239.54 
 
Appendix C5: At demand of 4000 MW (Hybrid and Pay as Bid) 
Generator 
Base Payment 
(RM) 
Pay as Bid 
Payment (RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 21,007.60 89,492.40 110,500 
G2 74,771.86 318,528.10 393,300 
G3 83,840.60 167,393.20 251,233.46 
G4 19,239.54 0 19,239.54 
 
Appendix C6: At demand of 5000 MW (Hybrid and Pay as Bid) 
Generator 
Base Payment 
(RM) 
Pay as Bid 
Payment (RM) 
Total Payment 
(RM) 
G1 21,007.60 89,492.40 110,500 
G2 74,771.86 318,528.10 393,300 
G3 83,840.60 357,159.70 441,000 
G4 19,239.54 22,160.46 41,400 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Detail Data on example of bilateral market model 
 
Appendix D1: At demand 1500 MW  
Appendix D2: At demand 4000 MW  
Appendix D3: At demand 5000 MW  
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Appendix D1: At demand 1500 MW  
Generator Energy Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM)
G1 110,500 110,500 
G2 161,500 161,500 
G3 0 0 
G4 0 0 
 
 
Appendix D2: At demand 4000 MW  
Generator Energy Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 110,500 110,500 
G2 393,300 393,300 
G3 268,800 268,800 
G4 0 0 
 
Appendix D3: At demand 5000 MW  
 
Generator Energy Payment (RM) Total Payment (RM) 
G1 110,500 110,500 
G2 393,300 393,300 
G3 441,000 441,000 
G4 41,400 41,400 
 
 
 
 
  
157
 
APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
Appendix E: Detail Data on comparison of a simple case study for all market 
models 
Appendix E1: Generator’s revenue at demand 1500 MW  
Appendix E2: Generator’s revenue at demand 4000 MW  
Appendix E3: Generator’s revenue at demand 5000 MW  
Appendix E4: Total generator’s revenue at all demand  
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Appendix E1: Generator’s revenue at demand 1500 MW 
Generator Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
G1 110,500 123,500 110,500 
G2 222,500 161,500 161,500 
G3 105,000 0 0 
G4 22,000 0 0 
 
 
Appendix E2: Generator’s revenue at demand 4000 MW 
Generator Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
G1 110,500 136,500 110,500 
G2 393,300 434,700 393,300 
G3 309,800 268,800 268,800 
G4 22,000 0 0 
 
 
Appendix E3: Generator’s revenue at demand 5000 MW 
Generator Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
G1 110,500 149,500 110,500 
G2 393,300 476,100 393,300 
G3 441,000 483,000 441,000 
G4 54,400 41,400 41,400 
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Appendix E4: Total generator’s revenue at all demand 
Generator Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
G1 331,500 409,500 331,500 
G2 1,009,100 1,072,300 948,100 
G3 855,800 751,800 709,800 
G4 54,400 41,400 41,400 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
Appendix F: Load Profile of Peninsular Malaysia 
Time 
Weekday Load 
(MW) 
Saturday Load 
(MW) 
Sunday Load 
(MW) 
Public Holiday 
Load (MW) 
0000-0100 10,525 10,369 10,073 9,212 
0100-0200 10,135 10,214 9,873 8,663 
0200-0300 9,756 9,798 9,478 8,257 
0300-0400 9,466 9,497 9,139 8,004 
0400-0500 9,228 9,280 8,897 7,723 
0500-0600 9,105 9,135 8,745 7,590 
0600-0700 9,248 9,165 8,759 7,479 
0700-0800 9,403 9,211 8,696 7,420 
0800-0900 9,926 9,305 8,376 7,197 
0900-1000 11,453 10,472 8,884 7,239 
1000-1100 12,129 11,175 9,432 7,453 
1100-1200 12,803 11,790 9,909 7,632 
1200-1300 12,750 11,763 10,031 7,699 
1300-1400 12,266 11,453 9,964 7,837 
1400-1500 12,348 11,558 10,096 7,999 
1500-1600 12,891 11,533 10,208 8,075 
1600-1700 12,900 11,475 10,170 8,080 
1700-1800 12,631 11,154 9,957 8,061 
1800-1900 11,696 10,634 9,691 8,176 
1900-2000 11,396 10,643 9,881 8,903 
2000-2100 12,206 11,583 10,950 9,596 
2100-2200 12,048 11,495 10,978 9,519 
2200-2300 11,553 11,111 10,759 9,229 
2300-2400 11,054 10,742 10,448 8,930 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
Appendix G: Detail Data on the simulations results on generation revenue  
 
 
Appendix G1: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. weekday load 
profile 
Appendix G2: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. Saturday load 
profile 
Appendix G3: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. Sunday load 
profile 
Appendix G4: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. Public Holiday 
load profile 
Appendix G5: Total generator revenue for each IPP for each market model; i.e. in a 
week 
Appendix G6: Total generator revenue for each IPP for each market model; i.e. in a 
month 
Appendix G7: Total generator revenue for each IPP for each market model; i.e. in 
annual revenue 
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Appendix G1: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. weekday load 
profile 
IPP 
Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/day 
G1 3,830,400.00 5,476,413.60 3,830,458.00 
G2 3,635,208.00 4,867,923.20 3,635,251.00 
G3 1,882,632.00 2,449,173.86 1,882,618.00 
G4 4,034,328.00 4,943,984.50 4,034,316.00 
G5 2,256,336.00 2,662,145.50 2,256,324.00 
G6 14,681,328.00 18,406,834.60 14,681,462.00 
G7 6,318,000.00 8,899,172.10 6,318,000.00 
G8 5,106,000.00 5,628,536.20 5,106,000.00 
G9 2,921,592.00 3,346,697.20 2,921,635.00 
G10 13,714,800.00 15,417,951.90 13,666,628.00 
G11 2,357,832.00 2,625,052.42 2,257,867.00 
G12 6,859,776.00 6,700,990.04 6,238,529.00 
G13 4,796,424.00 4,389,305.92 4,071,954.00 
G14 4,062,408.00 266,484.12 266,484.10 
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Appendix G2: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. Saturday load 
profile 
IPP Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/day
G1 3,830,400.00 5,273,632.80 3,830,457.60 
G2 3,635,208.00 4,687,673.60 3,635,251.20 
G3 1,882,632.00 2,358,485.78 1,882,618.08 
G4 4,034,328.00 4,760,918.50 4,034,316.00 
G5 2,256,336.00 2,563,571.50 2,256,324.00 
G6 14,681,328.00 17,725,265.80 14,681,462.40 
G7 6,318,000.00 8,569,653.30 6,318,000.00 
G8 5,106,000.00 5,420,122.60 5,106,000.00 
G9 2,921,592.00 3,222,775.60 2,921,635.20 
G10 13,623,840.00 14,728,204.17 13,559,875.47 
G11 2,270,952.00 2,400,856.12 2,155,902.18 
G12 6,157,506.00 5,478,730.88 5,383,247.04 
G13 1,901,394.00 824,238.16 824,238.16 
G14 3,850,008.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix G3: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. Sunday load 
profile 
IPP 
Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/Day 
G1 3,830,400.00 5,096,066.40 3,830,457.60 
G2 3,635,208.00 4,529,836.80 3,635,251.20 
G3 1,882,632.00 2,279,074.14 1,882,618.08 
G4 4,034,328.00 4,600,615.50 4,034,316.00 
G5 2,256,336.00 2,477,254.50 2,256,324.00 
G6 14,681,328.00 17,128,445.40 14,681,462.40 
G7 6,318,000.00 8,281,107.90 6,318,000.00 
G8 5,106,000.00 5,237,623.80 5,106,000.00 
G9 2,921,592.00 3,114,262.80 2,921,635.20 
G10 12,723,120.00 13,160,593.26 12,502,767.96 
G11 1,883,592.00 1,839,207.66 1,701,286.80 
G12 2,787,426.00 1,278,886.08 1,278,886.08 
G13 1,166,664.00 0.00 0.00 
G14 3,850,008.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix G4: Each generator revenue for each market model; i.e. public holiday load 
profile 
IPP 
Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/Day 
G1 3,830,400.00 4,856,457.60 3,830,457.60 
G2 3,635,208.00 4,316,851.20 3,635,251.20 
G3 1,882,632.00 2,171,915.76 1,882,618.08 
G4 4,034,328.00 4,384,302.00 4,034,316.00 
G5 2,256,336.00 2,360,778.00 2,256,324.00 
G6 14,681,328.00 16,323,093.60 14,681,462.40 
G7 6,318,000.00 7,891,743.60 6,318,000.00 
G8 5,106,000.00 4,991,359.20 5,106,000.00 
G9 2,804,092.00 2,829,500.20 2,783,300.20 
G10 6,282,240.00 4,943,590.17 4,943,590.17 
G11 451,752.00 20,843.58 20,843.58 
G12 1,737,336.00 0.00 0.00 
G13 1,166,664.00 0.00 0.00 
G14 3,850,008.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix G5: Total generator revenue for each IPP for each market model; i.e. in a week 
IPP 
Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/Week 
G1 26,812,800.00 37,751,767.20 26,813,203.20 
G2 25,446,456.00 33,557,126.40 25,446,758.40 
G3 13,178,424.00 16,883,429.22 13,178,326.56 
G4 28,240,296.00 34,081,456.50 28,240,212.00 
G5 15,794,352.00 18,351,553.50 15,794,268.00 
G6 102,769,296.00 126,887,884.20 102,770,236.80 
G7 44,226,000.00 61,346,621.70 44,226,000.00 
G8 35,742,000.00 38,800,427.40 35,742,000.00 
G9 20,451,144.00 23,070,524.40 20,451,446.40 
G10 94,920,960.00 104,978,556.93 94,395,785.43 
G11 15,943,704.00 17,365,325.88 15,146,522.58 
G12 43,243,812.00 40,262,567.16 37,854,779.52 
G13 27,050,178.00 22,770,767.76 21,184,007.76 
G14 28,012,056.00 1,332,420.60 1,332,420.60 
Total Gen 
Rev. 521,831,478.00 577,440,428.85 482,575,967.25 
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Appendix G6: Total generator revenue for each IPP for each market model; i.e. in a month 
IPP 
Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/month 
G1 107,251,200.00 151,007,068.80 107,252,812.80 
G2 101,785,824.00 134,228,505.60 101,787,033.60 
G3 52,713,696.00 67,533,716.88 52,713,306.24 
G4 112,961,184.00 136,325,826.00 112,960,848.00 
G5 63,177,408.00 73,406,214.00 63,177,072.00 
G6 411,077,184.00 507,551,536.80 411,080,947.20 
G7 176,904,000.00 245,386,486.80 176,904,000.00 
G8 142,968,000.00 155,201,709.60 142,968,000.00 
G9 81,804,576.00 92,282,097.60 81,805,785.60 
G10 379,683,840.00 419,914,227.72 377,583,141.72 
G11 63,774,816.00 69,461,303.52 60,586,090.32 
G12 172,975,248.00 161,050,268.64 151,419,118.08 
G13 108,200,712.00 91,083,071.04 84,736,031.04 
G14 112,048,224.00 5,329,682.40 5,329,682.40 
Total Gen Rev. 2,087,325,912.00 2,309,761,715.40 1,930,303,869.00 
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Appendix G7: Total generator revenue for each IPP for each market model; i.e. annual revenue 
IPP Single Buyer Pool Market Bilateral Market 
RM/year 
G1 1,287,014,400.00 1,812,084,825.60 1,287,033,753.60
G2 1,221,429,888.00 1,610,742,067.20 1,221,444,403.20
G3 632,564,352.00 810,404,602.56 632,559,674.88
G4 1,355,534,208.00 1,635,909,912.00 1,355,530,176.00
G5 758,128,896.00 880,874,568.00 758,124,864.00
G6 4,932,926,208.00 6,090,618,441.60 4,932,971,366.40
G7 2,122,848,000.00 2,944,637,841.60 2,122,848,000.00
G8 1,715,616,000.00 1,862,420,515.20 1,715,616,000.00
G9 981,654,912.00 1,107,385,171.20 981,669,427.20
G10 4,556,206,080.00 5,038,970,732.64 4,530,997,700.64
G11 765,297,792.00 833,535,642.24 727,033,083.84
G12 2,075,702,976.00 1,932,603,223.68 1,817,029,416.96
G13 1,298,408,544.00 1,092,996,852.48 1,016,832,372.48
G14 1,344,578,688.00 63,956,188.80 63,956,188.80
Total Gen Rev. 25,047,910,944.00 27,717,140,584.80 23,163,646,428.00
 
